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TITLE VII CONSENT DECREES AND THE
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Large-scale Title VII remedies are typical of "pvublic law" litiga-
tion, which differs in kindfrom the conventional compensatory lawsuit
Title VII remedies are commonly adopted by way of consent decrees.
By approving these consent decrees, federal courts take responsibility
for extensive institutional reforms while acting independently of the ad-
versaryprocess. Courts havefrequenty approved consent decrees with-
out fair hearings for those whose interests are at stake. Professor
Schwarzschild suggests a systematic procedure for approving Title VII
consent decrees. This procedure would not discourage settlements, but
would ensure that courts act on the basis offair hearings, consistently
with the quasi-legislative character ofpublic law remedies.
The federal courts have increasingly become the forum for litiga-
tion over the policies of large public and private institutions. These
lawsuits-sometimes called "public law"' or "structural" cases2 -in-
volve essentially political questions, although the cases remain adjudi-
cative in form. These cases give the courts broad discretion to decide
matters of public policy and they often affect large numbers of people,
including many who are not parties to the lawsuits. Lawsuits of this
kind are fraught with distinctive ambiguities that stem from the quasi-
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although it seems to me that some culpability should be shared by these friends and colleagues
who read the article and who are entitled, after all, to some of the credit.
1. See Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword* Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. Rav. 4, 6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court]; Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
2. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-ForewornS The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
Rv. 1, 2 (1979) (describing the structural suit as one that attempts to restructure the state bureau-
cracy by injunction) [hereinafter cited as Fiss, Forms of Justice]; see also 0. Fiss, INJuNCrIONS
415-81 (1972).
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legislative character of the decisions at stake.3
There is a remarkable tendency for this sort of case to culminate in
a consent decree-a broad injunction negotiated by the parties and rat-
ffied as a court order by the signature of a federal judge. Consent de-
crees first became prominent in antitrust cases, 4 and are now common
in every variety of lawsuit over public policy, including environmental
cases, 5 litigation over the rights of the institutionalized,6 school and
housing desegregation suits,7 and equal employment litigation. 8
By approving consent decrees in public law cases, courts put their
authority behind extensive reforms in the operations of major Ameri-
can institutions. What is more, consent decrees allow the courts to do
this independently of the traditional adversary process. If public law
litigation gives the courts an anomalously "legislative" power over
public policy, consent decrees compound the anomaly by invoking this
power outside the context of adversary litigation.
This article is about consent decrees under one "public law" stat-
ute: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 Title VII prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or
national origin,10 and it does so in rather general terms. It is a paradig-
matic piece of "public" legislation, not least in the way that it relegates
to the federal courts the task of giving specific content to the law. The
Title VII remedies actually adopted by the courts often prescribe exten-
sive "affrmative action," including racial quotas for hiring and promo-
tions. In most cases, moreover, courts adopt these controversial
3. Cf. Friendly, The Courts and SocialPolicy, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 40 (1978) (elaborate
affirmative decrees rendered by courts to resolve social issues are inherently ambiguous and courts
should recognize that such decrees have the qualities of social legislation).
4. See, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 319-20 (1927) (affirming consent
decree where parties in the antitrust case consented to it without any findings of fact or admission
of wrongdoing). Consent decrees are still very common in antitrust cases. See North Am. Tel.
Ass'n v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.) (approving an antitrust consent decree that is
radically transforming the telephone and telecommunications industry), a1 7'g United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
5. See, eg., Citizens For a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(affirming an environmental consent decree); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561
F.2d 904, 906-07 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
6. See, eg., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715,
719 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (consent decree guaranteeing inmates of the state facility a stipulated
level of care).
7. See, eg., Metropolitan Housing Dev. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1015
(7th Cir. 1980) (affirming approval of consent decree in action alleging racially discriminatory
zoning); United States v. Board of Educ., 88 F.R.D. 679, 681 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (mem.) (consent
decree entered in a suit to require the city to desegregate schools on a systemwide basis).
8. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
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remedies by way of consent decrees."I
The question underlying this article is whether such remedies can
be adopted by unlitigated court order in a way that is fair to all con-
cerned. "Affirmative action" remedies can have lasting effects on the
working lives of many people-minority and white, male and female-
but many of the people directly affected are not parties to the lawsuits
that bring forth these remedies. Courts have become increasingly at-
tentive to the rights of class members in civil rights class actions.' 2 In a
Title VII suit brought by a government civil rights agency, however,
there is no plaintiff class, so class action safeguards do not protect the
putative beneficiaries of the lawsuit. This is particularly significant
now, because the Reagan administration refuses to be party to certain
"affirmative action" remedies that might be sought by private plaintiffs.
As for white employees and job applicants, their interests often go en-
tirely unrepresented in government suits and class actions alike.
The United States Supreme Court recently declined to review the
case of a group of white job applicants whose "reverse discrimination"
suit against a public employer had been dismissed without trial by the
lower federal courts.' 3 The lower courts had dismissed the suit because
of the existence of a consent decree between the employer and a class of
minority Title VII plaintiffs. 14 The denial of certiorari drew a dissent
by Justices Rehnquist and Brennan-an odd couple-who observed
that a consent decree is not an adjudication on the merits and who
questioned the fairness of treating such a decree as precluding litigation
by nonparties to the agreement.' 5 Justices Rehnquist and Brennan
identify a very real problem, but this article will suggest that their im-
plied solution, namely litigation of the merits of the case, undervalues
the practical benefits of consensual settlements in public law cases.
11. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text. There is a growing body of literature on
the rights of class members in civil rights class actions. See, e.g., Anderson, The 4pproval and
Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil Rights Class.4ction Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 579,
586 (noting that judges must ensure that agreements reached by the parties adequately protect the
rights of absentee class members); Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title V1I Class
Actions, 69 VA. L. REv. 11, 83 (1983) (concluding that the preclusive effect of a Title VII class
action should be established at the earliest opportunity in litigation through class certification,
definition of its scope based on the claims of the named plaintiffs, and notice to class members
with an accompanying right to "opt out").
13. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 104 S. Ct. 255 (1983).
14. Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 67-68 (1982) (holding plaintiffs' "reverse dis-
crimination" complaints to be impermissibl collateral attacks on consent decrees), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 255 (1983).
15. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 104 S. Ct. 255, 256-59 (1983) (Relnquist, J., dissenting).
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The article is divided into four parts. Part I explains why Title VII
is a very good example of "public law" and points out how commonly
Title VII cases are resolved by consent decrees.' 6 Part II describes a
typical Title VII settlement and assesses why consent decrees are com-
mon in structural Title VII cases.17 Part III considers the constitutional
and jurisprudential anomalies of public law consent decrees, and sug-
gests why these very anomalies make consent decrees compatible with
public law adjudication while simultaneously creating special problems
of fairness.' 8 The final section focuses on how erratically the courts
have given a hearing to the "third parties" who are directly affected by
these decrees, and recommends a systematic procedure for approving
or refusing to approve consent decrees.' 9 The suggested procedure
would not discourage settlements, but would ensure that courts act only
after providing fair hearings for the various interests at stake, consist-
ently with the quasi-legislative character of public law remedies.
I. TITLE VII: A QUINTESSENTIAL EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC LAW
Title VII litigation is an excellent example of "public law" or
"structural" litigation.20 Title VII itself is "public" in the most obvious
sense that equal employment opportunity is prominent on the national
agenda. In the years since Title VII was adopted it has perhaps become
a commonplace that racial minorities should not be denied jobs "be-
cause of the color of their skin," but "affirmative action" continues to
be enormously provocative-one of the "legal" issues that ordinary
Americans are most likely to be aware of and to have opinions about.
By prohibiting discrimination in general terms,2 1 Congress implic-
itly invited the courts to make the basic policy decisions in this politi-
16. See infra notes 20-42 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 43-78 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 111-218 and accompanying text.
20. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978); Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 2,
at 2; see also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, supra note 1, at 1284.
21. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
lege of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982) (apparently immunizing from
liability any bona fide seniority or merit selection system). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)
("Definitions" which include no definition of "discrimination").
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cally charged area. The statute does not define discrimination and does
not specify how it should be proved. Thus, it is the Supreme Court, not
Congress, that established that tests, educational requirements, or other
job qualifications "neutral on their face and even neutral in terms of
intent" may violate Title VII if they have a disproportionate racial im-
pact.22 To a very considerable degree, the courts have defined the
"right" afforded by Title VII: not only the right to be free of deliber-
ately bigoted employment practices but also the right to be free of
many job requirements that disproportionately hurt a particular race,
sex, or ethnic group.
Like the "right," the "remedy" is largely judicially defined. The
Supreme Court, while endorsing Title VII as a charter for broad reme-
dial decrees, 23 has generally left it to the lower courts to decide what
relief to order. Even the remedies explicitly approved by the Supreme
Court can have a significant impact on an employer's workplace, as, for
example, when the Court endorsed the award of "retroactive seniority"
to victims of hiring discrimination.24 In many industries, seniority af-
fects an employee's working conditions and his likelihood of being laid
off; an award of retroactive seniority to one group of employees whom
the employer discriminated against in the past will affect the status of
other-for instance, white--employees in the future.25
22. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). A test or job qualification has
"adverse impact" if it screens out proportionately more minority applicants than whites. Under
the principles established by the courts, an employer who is sued under Title VII can justify a job
requirement that has adverse impact only if the employer convinces the courts that the require-
ment is a "business necessity." See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 434 (1975).
This, in turn, usually entails "validating" the requirement by demonstrating its correlation with
success on the job. The federal agencies that enforce Title VII have propounded very technical
and demanding guidelines for "validating" job requirements. See Uniform Guidelines on Em-
ployee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.18 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Guide-
lines]. These guidelines are generally given "great deference" by the courts. See Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 434. Cf Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARv. L. Rav. 945, 956
n.29 (1982) (noting that it is difficult to satisfy the Guidelines and to sustain the burdens of proof
laid down for employers in Griggs and related cases).
Courts have been less stringent about requiring validated job qualifications for highly skilled
jobs. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979); Spurlock v. United
Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972). See generally, Maltz Title VII and Upper Level
Employment-A Response to Professor Bartholet, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 776 (1983).
23. See, eg., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977)
(holding that Title VII intended to vest broad equitable powers in the courts); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
24. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,347-48 (1977); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-70 (1976).
25. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1982) (upholding such
seniority relief despite the effects on white employees). But see infra note 56.
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Federal district courts and courts of appeals, for their part, issue
sweeping remedial injunctions in Title VII cases that fundamentally
reshape the personnel policies of employers found liable for discrimi-
nation. Such remedies are designed not merely to correct the em-
ployer's specific misdeeds, but to create a new climate for employment
decisions in the future. Employers have been ordered to change their
recruitment policies, 26 to develop new tests for selecting job appli-
cants,27 to desegregate job assignments, 28 to institute training programs
for minority employees, 29 and to institute hiring and promotion
quotas.30
Title VII remedies, as such, are only loosely related to the viola-
tions they are intended to cure.31 This is because the specifics of a
broad prospective remedy do not follow inexorably from the fact that
26. See, e.g., United States v. Hazelwood School Dist., 534 F.2d 805, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1976),
rev'don other grounds, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n of N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d
79, 109-10 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 1971); Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715-18 (7th Cir. 1969).
29. See, e.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co. 541 F.2d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 1976), cert, denied,
429 U.S. 1041 (1977); seealso EEOC v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 398
F. Supp. 1237, 1264-65 (E.D. Pa. 1975), ajf'don other ground, 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976).
30. See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 280-84
(2d Cir. 1981) (requiring that 102 minority candidates be offered firefighter positions before any-
one else hired), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 988 (1982); United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643,
646 (2d Cir. 1980); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 616 F.2d 350, 364 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017,
1026 (Ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Rios v. Enterprises Assoc. Steam Fitters
Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 324 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Contractor Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 170
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Louisville Black Police Officers Org., Inc. v. City of
Louisville, 511 F. Supp. 825, 839 (W.D. Ky. 1979), afl'd, 700 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1983); see also
Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 74 MIcH. L. REV. I,
27-28 (1975) (pointing out that many courts treat quotas as an extreme remedy suitable only for
egregious cases of discrimination).
31. Of course, when an employer violates Title VII by denying someone a job on account of
race or sex, it is entirely consistent with the most traditional model of litigation to order the em-
ployer to offer the person the job, with retroactive seniority and back pay. Such remedies are
closely linked to the violation, they redress an individual grievance, they do not require any par-
ticular creativity or discretion, and they have limited impact on third parties. "Affirmative action"
measures such as quotas, on the other hand, are for the benefit of any member of a designated
minority group, without regard to whether a particular beneficiary has been discriminated against
by the employer in the past. In practice, "race-conscious" relief generally means some preference
for members of the minority group. See J. LIVINGSTONE, FAIR GAME? INEQUALITY AND AF-
FiRMATiVE ACTION 11 (1979) ("Affirmative action means preference on the basis of race or it
[means] nothing."). The preference is a "remedy" only in a loose or metaphorical sense, because
the individuals receiving "compensation" are most often not victims of past wrongdoing by the
employer. See Brest, The Supreme Court 1975 Term-Foreword& In Defense oftheAntidiscrimina.
tion Princple, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1976).
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the employer has been found guilty of discrimination. A different
quota-higher or lower-would not be unthinkable, nor would a dif-
ferent examination or scoring procedure for the examination, an alter-
nate training program, or a different seniority scheme.32 Choosing such
a remedy is a matter of discretion: it "necessarily involves a degree of
approximation and imprecision" 33 because no particular policy choice
for the future follows automatically from the employer's past violation
of Title VII.
All this makes Title VII litigation a formidable example of "public
law." The outcome of a Title VII case may be to restructure an em-
ployer's entire process of selecting, hiring, training, assigning, promot-
ing, and firing staff. Such a remedy affects not only the parties-the
plaintiffs and the employer-but also the incumbent employees, future
applicants, and the economic and moral interests of society as a whole.
When fashioning a decree, the court should properly take account of all
these interests, while vindicating the values implicit in Title VII. Be-
cause of the variety of interests at stake and the fact that there is no
automatic "right answer" about the decree's contents, a court must ex-
ercise discretion when it adjudicates a Title VII case. With an ambigu-
ity characteristic of "public law," there is a convergence of
discretionary policymaking and old-fashioned adjudication in any
large-scale Title VII remedy.34
Title VII is also "public" in another sense, namely that it has had a
palpable impact on American behavior. "Affirmative action" has be-
come entrenched in the management of most American institutions, as
affirmative action officers, utilization studies, goals and timetables, and,
above all, the widespread subjective awareness of "affirmative action"
as a legal or moral obligation have followed from Title VII.35
One widespread form of "compliance" with Title VII has been for
employers to sign consent decrees when sued or threatened with suit,
rather than attempting to prove their innocence or trying to persuade a
judge to impose a mild remedy. Thus, when the Justice Department
32. "There are nine and sixty ways/of constructing tribal lays/and every single one of them
is right." R. KIPLING, In the Neolithic Age, in BARRACK ROOM BALLADS, 342 (1940) (stanza 5).
33. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372 (1977).
34. See 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATrvE LAw TREATISE § 7:2 (2d ed. 1978) (on the ambiguous
distinction in administrative law between a quasi-adjudicatory "order" and the administrative
"rule-making" that resembles legislation); see also id at § 2:13 (on the relationship of lawmaking
to the exercise of discretionary power, especially discretionary power exercised by bodies other
than the elected legislature).
35. Of course, it is not just litigants, people or institutions that have sued or been sued, who
are affected. The law shapes the behavior of many who have not been involved in Title VII
litigation as well as those comparatively few who have been. The effectiveness of any law depends
on compliance by persons who are not directly coerced by the court.
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and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company36-a conglomerate
whose subsidiary companies at the time constituted the largest private
employer in the country37-the case was settled with an elaborate con-
sent decree.38 Consent decrees also resulted from the government's Ti-
tle VII suit against the nine major steel companies that, according to
the companies involved, constituted seventy-three percent of the coun-
try's basic steel industry and employed a total of more than 300,000
people.3 9 The federal civil service is extensively revising its hiring poli-
cies under a Title VII consent decree which, in part, calls for the aboli-
tion of the written test-the PACE exam-that had been used to screen
applicants for jobs in the federal bureaucracy.40 Between 1972 and
1983, the Justice Department sued and obtained relief under Title VII
against 106 state and local government employers;41 of these cases,
ninety-three-some eighty-eight percent-were settled by consent de-
cree.42 It would be fair to say that far more employees and job appli-
cants are directly affected by the provisions of consent decrees than by
litigated judgments in Title VII cases.
II. TITLE VII CONSENT DECREES
A. The Consent Decree Defned and Illustrated
A consent decree is a settlement agreement among the parties to a
lawsuit, signed by the court and entered as a judgment in the case. It is
a kind of legal hermaphrodite, with characteristics both of a contract
and of a court order. It is contractual in the obvious sense that it is
drafted and agreed upon by the parties: it is their bargain, it represents
36. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 438 U.S. 915
(1978).
37. See EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 n. I (E.D. Pa. 1973),
modofed506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974).
38. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438
U.S. 915 (1978).
39. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 834 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976).
40. Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 73 (D.D.C. 1981). More than 700,000 persons took
the PACE exam between 1976 and 1980. Id at 75.
41. Under the 1972 amendments to Title VII, the EEOC has jurisdiction to sue employers in
the private sector and the Justice Department is essentially restricted to enforcing Title VII against
state and local government agencies. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-261, §4, 86 Stat. 103, 104-07 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982)).
42. Files maintained at the United States Department of Justice corroborate this figure.
Thirteen of the ninety-three consent decrees were negotiated after there had been a trial on the
merits. Another thirteen cases were tried and resulted in a court order without a consent decree.
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the terms on which they are prepared to settle.43 But a consent decree
is not just a private contract. Unlike a contract, or a private out-of-
court settlement, a consent decree can be enforced by citation for con-
tempt of court; it has the authority of a judicial decree.44 Moreover,
like any injunction, a consent decree can also be modified by the court,
even over the objections of a party, in order "to effectuate the basic
purpose of the decree." 45
Consent decrees in Title VII cases are as varied as the cases them-
selves, but at least in "pattern-or-practice" suits brought by the federal
government,46 and in comparable class actions by private plaintiffs, 47 a
consent decree typically includes some or all of the following
provisions:
(1) A recital that the complaint has been filed and that the parties
agree to the decree although the defendant admits no liability;48
(2) An injunction against unlawful discrimination in the future on
the basis of race or sex against any employee or applicant for
employment; 49
(3) A stipulation of what the employer must do to recruit minority
applicants. The decree might specify, for instance, where the employer
must advertise, or what the ads should say, or that there must be a full-
or part-time minority recruiter, or how much money must be spent on
recruitment;5 0
(4) A provision forbidding the use of any written test or other job
qualification that disproportionately screens out minority applicants for
employment or for promotion, unless the test has been validated under
43. Courts sometimes hold, therefore, that consent decrees must be construed by the same
rules as are contracts. See, e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238
(1975), quotedin Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 557 (6th Cir. 1981).
44. See, e.g., EEOC v. Local Union No. 38,28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1567, 1575 (N.D.
Cal. 1981) (contempt citation).
45. A contested modification requires a hearing and findings of fact. See United States v.
Atlantic Ref. Co., 360 U.S. 19, 23 (1959). The object of the hearing, however, is not to litigate the
merits of the original lawsuit, but rather to consider whether modification is justified in light of the
policy underlying the consent decree and the events that have occurred since the decree was ap-
proved. See Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 1981).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1982) (providing the statutory basis for such suits).
47. See, e.g., Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372 (9th Cir. 1979) (class action
brought by private plaintiffs), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 926 (1980).
48. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); see also United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 111 (1931).
49. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977); Lamphere v. Brown Univ., 491 F. Supp. 232, 238 (D.R.I. 1980), af'd, 685 F.2d
743 (1st Cir. 1982).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Sheriff of Lancaster Country, 561 F. Supp. 1005, 1012 (E.D. Va.




the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures;5 l
(5) A hiring "goal" or quota. This is often couched in the form of
an "ultimate goal" that the employer's staff should reflect the racial or
sexual makeup of the labor force upon which the employer draws,5 2
and an "interim" quota-usually higher than the ultimate goal-im-
posed in order to achieve the ultimate goal within a foreseeable period
of years. Such a quota typically stipulates that some proportion of all
vacancies for a period of years must be filled by minorities;5 3
51. Uniform Guidelines, supra note 22, at § 1607.1. Because some minority groups-blacks
especially-score lower, on average, than do whites on most written tests, and because "valida-
tion" is difficult and expensive, such a provision discourages the use of tests, or at least discourages
hiring or promotion in "rank order" on the basis of test scores. When test scores are used in "rank
order," the first job goes to the applicant with the highest score, the second job to the second
highest scorer, and so forth.
A test's "adverse impact" on minorities can sometimes be reduced or eliminated by using the
test on a "pass-fail" basis, especially if the minimum passing score is not set too high. This ap-
proach permits the employer to screen out the lowest-scoring applicants without necessarily
screening out all the minority applicants. The employer must then decide on the basis of some-
thing other than the test scores whom to hire or promote first. The logic of this approach is that an
applicant who gets a 91 on the test will not necessarily be a better worker than one who gets a 90,
while an applicant who fails the test entirely might really be a poor employment risk. See United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 917 (5th Cir. 1973) ("no relationship was demonstrated
between successful job performance and the ability to achieve the Company-established cut-off
score" on the test); Alexander v. Bahou, 86 F.R.D. 194, 197-98 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (racial hiring
goals shall be accomplished by hiring candidates who have passed an "appropriate" civil service
exam).
52. See, e.g., Jones v. Milwaukee County, 85 F.R.D. 715, 718 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Officers for
Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F. Supp. 801, 813 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (goal of hiring scheme
under consent decree is to create a work force that "reflects the racial, ethnic and sexual composi-
tion of the relevant labor force"), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1219 (1982). For a relatively unskilled
job this labor force might be the local labor force as a whole; for a more specialized job it might be
the local, regional, or national class of persons with the minimum necessary skills or education.
53. Under the Reagan administration, which is on record as opposing quotas, the United
States Department of Justice in its Title VII enforcement actions no longer enters into consent
decrees requiring quota hiring or promotion. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JusTicE, LE-
GAL AcTvmEs: 1984-1985, 19 ("The Employment Litigation Section. . . does not use preferen-
tial selection requirements that confer an undeserved benefit on nonvictims of discrimination"
[i.e., quotas] in its Title VII litigation.). It does, however, sign decrees providing that the employer
should recruit enough qualified minority applicants so that a stated percentage of all applicants
will be minorities. The decrees state the "expectation" that nondiscriminatory hiring should result
in approximately the same percentage of minorities being hired as apply. See, e.g., United States
v. New Hampshire, No. 81-457-D (D.N.H. Sept. 17, 1981); United States v. Vermont, No. 81-380
(D. Vt. Dec. 14, 1981). This is somewhat "softer" than an explicit quota, but if an employer hired
a significantly smaller percentage of minorities than applied, then only a "valid" selection process
would justify the "adverse impact." See Uniform Guidelines, supra note 22, at § 1607.3(a).
As a practical matter, the "recruitment goals" generally reflect the percentage of qualified
minorities in the work force upon which the defendant draws; such a "recruitment goal" is apt to
be somewhat lower than the "interim goals and timetables" which were designed to accelerate the
process of integration. Again, as a practical matter, it may be easier under the new, more gently-
worded decrees for a defendant to convince a court that it is complying in good faith even if it falls
somewhat short of recruiting and hiring in the stipulated percentages.
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(6) A promotion "goal" or quota. This is similar to a hiring quota
except that a promotion goal reserves a stipulated proportion of promo-
tions to minorities or women;54
(7) Provisions requiring that training programs be open to minori-
ties and women, and that minorities and women may not be disfavored
in assignments, discipline, and fringe benefits; 55
(8) Seniority relief. The employer may agree to grant seniority to
victims of discrimination, retroactive to the time they should have been
hired;56
(9) Back pay. The employer may agree to pay a stipulated sum in
back pay to victims of job discrimination, or to set aside a sum of
money to be distributed under court supervision according to a formula
to be agreed upon later.57 In a class action brought by private plain-
tiffs, as opposed to a suit by a federal civil rights agency, the decree
may also include plaintiffs' attorney fees;58
(10) Recordkeeping and reporting requirements;59
(11) Appointment of a monitor. A few decrees, but by no means a
majority, have provided for the appointment of a monitor or officer to
oversee administration of the decree and to try to resolve disputes that
might arise;60 and
(12) A stipulation that the court retain jurisdiction of the case and
that the parties may file motions for interpretation 6t or modification of
54. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc'y v. City of New York, 96 F.R.D. 626, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (settle-
ment provides that a sufficient number of black firefighters must be promoted so as to achieve a
work-force ratio of 3.7%).
55. See, e.g., EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 634 F.2d 1273, 1277 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 986 (1981); Moore v. City of San Jose, 615 F.2d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1980).
56. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 390 (1982) (stewardesses who
had been dismissed for pregnancy in violation of Title VII reinstated with seniority retroactive to
the date they were originally hired); see also United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559 (1977).
Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352-53 (1977) (bona fide sen-
iority system is not itself illegal under Title VII even if it perpetuates the advantages of whites
hired discriminatorily before Title VII went into effect); accord, Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2587-89 (1984).
57. See, e.g., Officers For Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 627-30 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
58. See, e.g., Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647 (1st Cir. 1978) (award of attorney fees for
plaintiffs' lawyers not necessarily precluded when the case concludes with consent decree); see also
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) (Title VII provision authorizing attorney fees for the "prevailing
party").
59. See, e.g., Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 617-18 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Sheriff of Lancaster County, 561 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D. Va. 1983).
60. See, ag., Officers For Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 636 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
61. On the interpretation of consent decrees, see Anderson, supra note 12, at 615-32.
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the decree.62 A decree usually remains in effect for a stipulated number
of years---commonly five or ten-but often provides that any party can
move for earlier dissolution or extension of its life, depending on
whether the objectives of the decree have been met.63
B. Title VII Consent Decrees-Their Popularity Explained
Consent decrees are common in Title VII cases," in part because
settlement is always an attractive alternative to litigation, in part be-
cause consent decrees are virtually symbiotic with public law, and in
part because of some specific characteristics of Title VII.
Title VII consent decrees have all the commonplace virtues of set-
tlements. A consent decree saves all concerned the potentially enor-
mous costs in time, money, and emotional toll that might otherwise go
62. In the early years of antitrust consent decrees, courts were reluctant to tamper with a
decree unless there was a "clear showing" that changed circumstances made it "grievously wrong"
to carry on with the original decree. The emphasis was on the need for finality ofjudgment and,
implicitly, on the idea that the parties should live with the agreement they make. See United
States v. Swift & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971); see generally Note, Flexibility and Finality in
Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1324-27 (1967); Note, Requests by the Govern-
mentfor Modfcation of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L.J. 657, 658 (1966).
Several contemporary courts have explicitly recognized, however, that a public law consent
decree is different in kind from a settlement that primarily affects only the parties. These courts
have held that the entry of a civil rights consent decree should therefore be the beginning of an
"ongoing remedial process." Sarabia v. Toledo Police Patrolman's Ass'n, 601 F.2d 914, 919 (6th
Cir. 1979). On this view, a consent decree is a kind of "prediction" of what remedy will be socially
effective, and the court should be available to modify it if it is not working. See Philadelphia
Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1121 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1026
(1980). See generally Fiss, Forms oJustice, supra note 2, at 49 (discussing need to revise consent
decrees); see also Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 73 F.R.D. 370, 371-74 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
(raising a consent decree's minority hiring quota from 33% to 50% and promotion quota from 25%
to 33%, because unforeseen budget cutbacks had drastically reduced the number of jobs being
filled and little progress was therefore being made towards the decree's objective of integrating the
State Police), aj#'d, 578 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1978). Cf. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984) (holding that courts may not modify Title VII consent decrees to provide
that lay-offs caused by budget restrictions must not reduce the proportion of minorities in any job
category). Such a modification would require laying off whites with greater seniority in place of
minorities hired more recently under the affirmative action provisions of the consent decree. The
Supreme Court rejects dilution of seniority rights as inconsistent with Section 703(h) of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977).
63. See, eg., EEOC v. Bartenders Int'l Union Local 41, 28 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1575,
1576 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (extending the duration of the decree where neither the interim quotas nor
the ultimate goal had been met). After a consent decree is entered, the court may still have a
delicate job of management: coordinating compliance by what is often a large and ramified insti-
tution, interpreting the decree as unforeseen problems arise, resolving disputes, and modifying the
decree should circumstances change. See generally Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker, 65
VA. L. REv. 43 (1979); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982).
64. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1984:887
CONSENT DECREES
into large-scale Title VII litigation.65 Moreover, like any settlement, a
consent decree is a compromise that spares all parties the risk of losing
the case in a "winner-take-all" lawsuit.66
Consent decrees are particularly compatible with structural public
law cases. A remedy designed to reform the workings of a large organi-
zation is most effective when the organization cooperates in carrying
out the remedy, and the human beings who make up an institution are
more apt to cooperate in carrying out a negotiated scheme than in com-
plying with an order imposed from above by a court.67 Public law set-
tlements are often complicated documents designed to be carried out
over a period of years, however, so any purely out-of-court settlement
would suffer the decisive handicap of not being subject to continuing
oversight and interpretation by the court. Courts are available to re-
solve disputes over the implementation of a consent decree, and may
impose stiffer requirements if a defendant is not carrying out its obliga-
tions.68 Above all, a consent decree has the moral authority of a fed-
eral court order, with disobedience punishable as contempt of court,
and a defendant institution is subject to that order throughout the years
that the decree is in effect. For all these reasons, consent decrees have
become a popular vehicle for public law remedies.69
Specific characteristics of Title VII also make consent decrees at-
tractive to parties and to the courts. From a defendant's viewpoint, a
charge of employment discrimination is often difficult to rebut. Once
the plaintiff shows statistically that minorities or women have not been
hired or promoted in the proportion that they apply, the defendant can
65. These savings will vary, of course, with the content of the decree and the stage of the
proceedings when it is signed. There is sometimes a partial consent decree, which resolves some
issues and leaves others to be litigated. See, e.g., High v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 592 F.2d 1330,
1332 (5th Cir. 1979) (litigating small portion of a case otherwise settled in a massive consent
decree). Moreover, a consent decree can be entered at any time from the filing of the complaint
until final judgment is rendered. Obviously, a consent decree submitted after the trial, but before
the judgment, saves less time and trouble than does a decree submitted and approved earlier in the
game.
66. A consent decree does not entail a finding of liability, so it has no collateral estoppel
effect. Theoretically, a consent decree also has no stare decisis effect, although parties negotiating
consent decrees tend to use existing decrees as models, so Title VII consent decrees have come to
bear a strong family resemblance to one another over time.
67. See Diver, supra note 63, at 90 (arguing that successful reform requires cooperation from
those whose behavior must be altered and therefore judicial remedies must be designed to assure
active involvement of those affected).
68. A court may grant "supplemental relief' when a party, usually the defendant, has failed
to comply with the original consent decree. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F. Supp.
1196, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1980); EEOC v. Bartenders Int'l Union Local 41, 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1575, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
69. For a further discussion of the relationship between consent decrees and public law, see
infra notes 79-110 and accompanying text.
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defeat an inference of discrimination only by proving that there is a
"valid business necessity" for the job prerequisite, written test, or oral
interview that is responsible for the disproportionate results. Proving
"business necessity" is often difficult to do.70 In addition, there is a
stigma associated with being a defendant charged with race or sex dis-
crimination, and litigation guarantees publicity. A defendant-
whether a corporate employer or a public bureaucracy-may prefer a
quick settlement to a well-publicized lawsuit.7'
There is a more subtle factor that may make consent decrees at-
tractive to Title VII plaintiffs. The Supreme Court has never explicitly
upheld racial or sexual quotas as court-ordered remedies,72 and it re-
mains controversial whether minority groups or women should receive
preferential treatment by court decree. Plaintiffs in Title VII cases may
sense that such "affirmative action" is more readily acceptable to the
courts and to society if it arises through negotiated compromise rather
than through full-blown adversarial litigation.73
70. See supra note 22.
71. As in any public law case, the relief in a Title VII case will affect the employer's opera-
tions for years to come, so the defendant has a strong interest in participating as much as possible
in formulating the decree. A defendant obviously has more say in negotiating a consent decree
than in a court order handed down after it loses the case. Moreover, there is always the possibility
that the employer, or at least some of the human beings who constitute that corporate entity, will
feel that minorities were wrongly excluded from the staff or are too sparsely represented on it;
such an employer might simply wish to get on with a remedy.
72. See,, e.g., Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated as
moot sub noma. Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461 U.S. 477
(1983); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200 (1979), the Court upheld an in-
plant training program in which half the places were reserved for black employees, but empha-
sized that this was a "voluntary" scheme, collectively bargained by a private employer and a
union and not created under court order. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1977), four Justices broadly approved "affirmative action" quotas and preferences for minorities,
four Justices said that the University's "affirmative action" policy excluded whites on the basis of
their race and was therefore illegal, and Justice Powell's individual opinion became the judgment
of the court, striking down the University's quota system but holding that a school may take race
into account in admitting students in order to encourage a "robust exchange of ideas" in the
classroom. Id at 313-24. Powell noted that the courts of appeals in employment discrimination
cases "have fashioned various types of racial preferences as remedies for constitutional or statu-
tory violations resulting in identified, race-based injuries to individuals held entitled to the prefer-
ence." Id at 301. In a footnote, he added that Bakke "does not call into question congressionally
authorized administrative actions, such as consent decrees under Title VII .... " Id at 302 n.41.
The significance of these dicta by one justice is debatable. See also Firefighters Local Union No.
1787 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576, 2588-90 (1984) (suggesting that Title VII does not permit remedial
racial quotas and authorizes "relief only to those who have been actual victims of illegal
discrimination").
73. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979) (upholding "affirmative
action" quotas negotiated privately, in the absence of any formal adjudication). A consent decree
occupies a middle ground between a purely private bargain and a litigated court order.
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From the judge's point of view, of course, a consent decree saves
an enormous amount of time and trouble;74 a consent decree appeals to
what might be called the "principle of least judicial effort." Moreover,
a judge quite properly encourages a settlement when it fosters a concili-
atory atmosphere in which the employer is more likely to comply with
the letter and the spirit of the decree.75
Less creditably, perhaps, some judges may welcome Title VII con-
sent decrees as an opportunity to avoid grappling with the policy di-
lemmas and moral ambiguities lurking about "affirmative action."
This article suggests, among other things, that consent decrees should
not exempt the courts from considering the effects of negotiated decrees
on those who are not parties to the negotiations.76
Federal courts have certainly been hospitable to Title VII consent
decrees, and have interpreted Title VII itself to favor conciliation, vol-
untary compliance, and, by extension, consent decrees as a "preferred
means" of resolving employment discrimination cases.77 In fact, Title
VII consent decrees are approved in the overwhelming majority of
cases in which they are submitted to federal judges.78
III. CASE WITHOUT CONTROVERSY
By definition, a consent decree can come into force without a trial
74. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 851 n.28 (5th Cir.
1975) (speculating that trial on the merits could take 28 years), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
Cf. United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 625 F.2d 918, 951 (10th Cir. 1979) (protracted
Title VII litigation); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 421-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977).
75. In public law litigation, even a decree in a contested case may to some extent be a negoti-
ated affair. After the verdict is handed down, the court may ask the defendant as well as the
plaintiff for a proposed order, and will usually try to develop a decree after taking account of all
parties' concerns. See Diver, supra note 63, at 51-53 ("The decree [follows] an extended process
[beginning] with a court order to the defendants to submit a comprehensive plan for the eradica-
tions of violations. ... ). With a consent decree, of course, the parties assume even more of the
responsibility.
76. See infra notes 111-218 and accompanying text.
77. See, eg., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 847 (5th Cir. 1975)
(quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1977) ("cooperation and voluntary
compliance were. . . the preferred means")) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).; see also Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435,
442 (5th Cir. 1981); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1174 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
967 (1976).
78. See, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987, 991 (5th Cir. 1982) (consent
decrees enjoy presumption of validity in Title VII litigation); United States v. City of Alexandria,
614 F.2d 1358, 1361 (5th Cir. 1980) ("district courts have generally approved proposed settlements
and appellate courts have only rarely reversed decisions approving settlements"). A district
judge's refusal to enter a consent decree can be appealed immediately; the parties need not first
litigate the merits of the case. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981).
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and without judicial findings of fact and conclusions of law.79 This
creates at least the appearance that consent decrees are jurispruden-
tially anomalous. To understand Title VII consent decrees, one must
consider the apparent anomaly in the context of public law adjudica-
tion and its special needs.
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only de-
cide "cases or controversies. ' 80 Courts have derived an intricate net-
work of doctrines from the "case or controversy" requirement. 8' These
"justiciability" doctrines often have an air of scholastic theology about
them, but at root they reflect the view that only certain decisions should
be made by courts in a democratic society; other decisions should be
made and disputes resolved-if at all-by nonjudicial institutions. 82
This principle is near enough a platitude that it is accepted not only by
"conservatives" who think that the proper business of the courts is
traditional private law decisionmaking,83 but also by "liberals" who are
favorably disposed toward lawsuits over public policy.84
One leitmotiv of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is that
79. Some consent decrees, of course, are submitted only after the trial has begun or even after
the trial is over. See, e.g., United States v. County of Fairfax, 629 F.2d 932, 942 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981). Even so, consent decrees are routinely entered before the par-
ties ever come to court in conflict about the case.
80. See U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2.
81. Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81-82 (1978)
(plaintiffs with environmental and aesthetic concerns have standing to challenge a law limiting
liability of power utilities) with Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. 426 U.S. 26, 40-42
(1976) (indigents lack standing to challenge favorable tax treatment for hospitals that offer limited
services for indigents); compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975) (plaintiffs lack
standing when their injury is speculative) with United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 684-85 (1973) (public interest organization has stand-
ing despite "attenuated line of causation"); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617
(1973) (plaintiff must show "sufficient nexus" between injury and the challenged government
action).
82. For a sample of recent scholarly comment on this inexhaustible topic, see generally
Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III- Perspectives on the Case or Controversy Requirement,
93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601
(1968); Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (1973);
Tushnet, The Sociology ofArticle III- A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1698
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Sociology of Article 111]; Tushnet, The New Law ofStanding: A Plea
for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977).
83. See Fuller, The Forms andLimits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978) (empha-
sizing a traditional view of the limits of litigation in a democracy).
84. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JusTcEpassim (1969); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
sTrrUTIONAL LAW § 3-21 (1978) (arguing for a broader view of justiciability). Even Professor
Mark Tushnet, a stalwart of the "critical legal studies" movement, seems to agree that parties
should have at least some minimal standing in order to meet the "case or controversy" require-
ment. Tushnet, Sociology of Article III, supra note 82, at 1706.
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lawsuits in federal court should have "adverse" parties.8 5 The Supreme
Court has said that federal courts should act only after hearing "a clash
of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situa-
tion embracing conflicting and demanding interests. ' 86 Because
judges, unlike congressional committees, traditionally have no in-
dependent means of fact-finding and must rely on the facts introduced
into evidence by the parties, the "judicial process" itself is said to re-
quire adversary proceedings. Resolving contested disputes is what dis-
tinguishes the work of a court from the policymaking of an 6xecutive or
legislative body.87
If the role of the federal courts really were so neatly demarcated,
and especially if Article III restricted the courts to deciding contested
lawsuits, then consent decrees would be entirely anomalous. In fact,
the courts traditionally issue orders in a variety of non-adversarial con-
texts. Kenneth Culp Davis pointed out a generation ago that the ab-
sence of any "controversy" does not prevent the federal courts from
admitting aliens to citizenship, issuing uncontested subpoenas, presid-
ing over uncontested bankruptcy proceedings, or disposing of criminal
cases in which the defendant pleads guilty. 88 It is widely accepted to-
day that judicial functions overlap legislative, executive, administra-
tive, and even private functions and that there is no uniquely "correct"
forum-court, Congress, city council, Masonic lodge-in which any
given family quarrel, zoning dispute, corporate reorganization, or alle-
85. The adversary system draws philosophical justification from John Stuart Mi's notion
that truth is best sought through vigorous debate. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 1, 13-48 (R. McCallum ed. 1948); seeNote,
Judicial Determinations in Nonadversary Proceedings, 72 HARV. L. REV. 723, 736 (1959) (noting
Mill's emphasis on disputation and argument as means towards truth). But cf J. STEPHEN, Lm-
ERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY passim (1873) (the classic Victorian rebuttal of Mill).
86. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1967) (citing United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157
(1961)).
87. Justice Felix Frankfurter is particularly identified with this view of the role of federal
courts in the constitutional scheme: "Regard for the separation of powers and for the importance
to correct decision of adequate presentation of issues by clashing interests restricts the courts of the
United States to issues presented in an adversary manner." Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 151 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also Frankfurter,
Advisory Opinion in I ENCLYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 475, 478 (1930) (discussing the
disadvantages of advisory opinions); Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47,
47-48 (1970) (per curiam) ("We are... confronted with the anomaly that both litigants desire
precisely the same result .... There is, therefore, no case or controversy within the meaning of
Art. III of the Constitution.").
William Blake was evidently a Frankfurter man: "Without Contraries is no progression."
V. BLAKE, Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in COMPLETE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM BLAKE 149 (G.
Keynes, ed. 1972).
88. 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 34, at § 21:01.
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gation of employment discrimination must be resolved.8 9
Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld consent decrees long
before there was any statutory basis for them.90 More recently, Con-
gress has explicitly endorsed and regulated consent decrees in antitrust
cases.91 Even in the absence of explicit legislation, courts continue to
infer congressional approval for consent decrees in such areas as civil
rights. Thus, the Supreme Court endorses Title VII consent decrees as
consistent with the statute's preference for "voluntary settlement of em-
ployment discrimination claims. '92
The nature of public law or structural adjudication may actually
make "adverseness" less important as a source of information for the
courts than it is in the conventional tort or contract case. Courts tradi-
tionally rely on the parties to develop the "facts" of a case. At the out-
set of a trial the court is ignorant of events between the parties and each
party attempts to establish its version of what occurred. This exercise in
historical reconstruction is important precisely because the remedy, if
any, will correspond closely to the cause of liability. The specifics of
what the defendant did and the context in which he did it will establish
whether he was negligent or whether he entered into an enforceable
bargain; the plaintiff's actual losses will usually establish the basis for
damages. This framework is admirably suited to traditional litigation,
but it has limited applicability to public law adjudication because there
is a paradoxical sense in which the facts do not matter in a public law
89. See Cover, Dispute Resolution:" A Foreword, 88 YALE L.J. 910, 910 (1979) (courts are
merely one way of resolving disputes).
90. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1931) (upholding a consent decree in
a suit brought by the United States under the Sherman Act). See also United States v. ITT Conti-
nental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 243 (1975).
91. Antitrust Procedures & Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706, 1706-08 (1974)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982)).
The requirement that parties be "adverse" is largely a matter of judicial self-restraint, al-
though the Supreme Court has insisted that the "bare minima" for justiciability are required by
Article III. SeeUnited States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n.18 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
Thus, were courts to reject consent decrees on "case-or-controversy" grounds when such decrees
are authorized by statute, courts would have to declare them unconstitutional and not merely
incompatible with the limitations "closely related to Article III concerns but essentially matters of
judicial self-governance." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,500 (1974). See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 130-33 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (standing requirement imposed by Court upon itself to
effectuate separation of powers); see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1935) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (Court has developed a series of rules to avoid passing
upon many of the constitutional questions with which it is presented).
92. Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981); cf. Monaghan supra note
82, at 1376-77 (arguing that Congress should control the extent to which courts bypass the tradi-
tional justiciability rules in public law cases). The question remains, of course, how freely the
courts may inter.pret acts of Congress as relaxing or tightening the traditional rules.
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case. They do not matter to the extent that the specifics of the remedy
will not be decided on the basis of "what the defendant did."
In short, the choice of remedies in public law cases properly de-
pends on "legislative facts" as much as on "adjudicative facts." The
distinction is a familiar one. Adjudicative facts concern the past ac-
tions of the parties: "who did what, where, when, how, why, with what
motive or intent."93 Legislative facts are more general judgments-
often not conclusively provable-which courts use to "decide questions
of law and policy and discretion. '94 The significance of the distinction
is that when courts decide "adjudicative facts" they must generally do
so on the basis of a trial.95 Legislative facts, on the other hand, are not
necessarily litigated.96
In a Title VII case, adjudicative facts are not decisive to the extent
that particular remedies do not follow from a finding that the employer
discriminated. The specifics of the remedy will depend substantially on
what the court thinks will be fair and effective in the future: whether a
hiring or promotion quota is an appropriate vehicle for integration,
how high the quota should be, how flexible, how much money should
be spent on minority recruitment or training, how much emphasis to
put on "validating" the job qualifications. These judgments, obviously,
cannot be made without knowing "facts" about the employer's business
and the surrounding community, but most important are legislative
facts concerning the present or the future, not the historical facts of
liability which are the subject of conventional litigation. Similarly, the
"law"-specifically the law dictating what remedies are appropriate-
does not entirely lend itself to adversary argument in Title VII cases,
because the governing rule is that the court has broad remedial discre-
tion.97 Adversary argument is not necessarily the court's best source of
guidance on how to exercise this discretion intelligently. Choosing a
remedy among many possibilities, all of them perfectly "legal," is more
open-ended and less a matter of "right" or "wrong" than deciding how
to apply a Uniform Commercial Code provision or whether a tort pre-
93. 2 K. DAvis, supra note 34, at § 12:3.
94. Id The distinction was first proposed in Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in
the Administratire Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402-16 (1942).
95. "A party whose interest is protected by due process is entitled to opportunity for a trial-
type hearing on disputed adjudicative facts." 2 K. DAvis, supra note 34, at § 12:3.
96. See Association of Natl Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(legislative facts "need not be developed through evidentiary hearings"), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921
(1980); Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 545 F.2d 194, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (where
the agency is involved in rule-making, rather than adjudication, no hearing is required).
97. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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cedent is distinguishable. 98
Of course, one must beware of exaggerating the distance between
"public" litigation and the dowdy old "private" kind. Even the most
ordinary contract or trespass suit is fraught with presuppositions about
"public" questions such as the right to property, the social sources and
limits of individuals' rights to self-determination, and the relation of
the individual to the State.99 In addition, the remedies in contempo-
rary public litigation are not completely unhinged from the adjudica-
tive facts that make for liability. If a Title VII defendant denies all
wrongdoing, litigates, and wins, a court will not proceed to impose a
remedial injunction anyway. Even where a defendant has been held
liable, the courts must grapple with the question of how narrowly the
remedy in an institutional case should be designed to correct the
demonstrated historical violation, or, coming at it from the other direc-
tion, how broadly it should be designed to correct the social problems
that formed the context of the violation.1° In public law cases, the
relationship of remedy to violation is ambiguous and indirect, but it is
not entirely non-existent.
98. The courts therefore seek the cooperation of the parties in choosing workable remedies in
public law cases. See Diver, supra note 63, at 62-64 (on the limits of the adversary model in
institutional litigation); see also Monaghan, supra note 82, at 1372-74 (where constitutional ques-
tion turns on legislative facts, factual determination has little bearing on resolution).
99. See Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the
Common Law, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 599, 600 (1980) ("theories. . . that divorce sovereignty from
the daily business of private life are in error"). Courts have always had occasion to prescribe
remedies that shape the future conduct of institutions as well as of individuals, with social ramifi-
cations affecting people who are not parties to the litigation. See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordi-
nary and the Extraordinary in InstitutionalLigation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465, 466 (1980) (suggesting
that "institutional" adjudication is not so different from what courts have always done, and that it
is an error to mistake new substantive rights for a completely new style of judicial behavior). One
might add that law school casebooks are essentially anthologies of cases, beginning with Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), that have public ramifications.
100. This dilemma is illustrated in several Supreme Court school desegregation decisions. In
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977), for example, the Court remanded the
case to the district court to "determine how much incremental segregative effect the violations had
on the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as presently constituted, when that
distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional viola-
tions." The Court insisted that the remedy be narrowly designed "to redress that difference." Id
Yet in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279-82 (1977), decided the same day, the Court pre-
scribed "remedial" education programs that did not directly redress past segregation policies, and
in later cases like Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 529 (1979) and Columbus Bd.
of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,455 (1979), the Court approved system-wide desegregation plans
that went beyond the demonstrated violations by the defendants in those cases. See generally
Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution. Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE
LJ. 635, 679-83 (1982) (Brinkman and Milliken illustrate that the Court has not stated clearly how
closely an injunctive remedy must be tied to a constitutional violation).
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Nonetheless, perhaps the defining characteristic of public law liti-
gation is its "legislative" flavor. Choices of public law remedies are
heavily influenced by "legislative facts" concerning society and public
policy. The remedies themselves have a broad public impact, ex-
tending far beyond the parties before the court, much in the style of
public legislation. These "legislative" characteristics make public law
adjudication anomalous by the yardstick of traditional private
litigation.'0 '
Consent decree cases have all the anomalous characteristics of any
public law case, but in a more radical form. Public law cases are gener-
ally concerned not so much with liability as with questions of remedy
that are only loosely related to the issue of the defendant's misdeeds; a
consent decree requires no contested findings of fact. In public law
cases the clash between the parties is usually somewhat blurred; a con-
sent decree requires no adversary litigation. Any public law case is
anomalously "political" because it requires discretionary policy deci-
sions by the courts that might more conventionally be made by other
branches of government. When approving a consent decree, the court
actually delivers its power of institutional reform-and its discretion
over the means of reform-to the parties who draft the agreement.
Title VII consent decrees are thus a double anomaly. Any Title
VII remedy with elaborate "affirmative action" provisions is "political"
because it embodies discretionary policy decisions about the future op-
erations of an institution. This anomaly is compounded when the in-
junction has been written by the parties themselves, without adversarial
presentation of the issues to the court, without trial, without findings of
fact, and without conclusions of law.
An anomaly, even a double one, is not the end of the world. There
is often an academic tendency to appraise public law adjudication by
old-fashioned "private law" standards of the judicial process, standards
which never completely corresponded with the role of courts in Ameri-
can society.102 It is a fact that the courts are a forum for institutional
change, and the federal courts in particular are an active part of the
American political process. In such varied fields as antitrust, 0 3 regu-
101. See supra notes 1-2.
102. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 140 (P. Bradley ed. 1946).
103. See, e.g. North Am. Tel. Ass'n v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (mem.), a 'gUnited
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982).
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lated industries, 104 the rights of prisoners'05 and hospital patients, 0 6
school desegregation, 10 7 and employment discrimination, 08 institu-
tional policy decisions are routinely adopted through the judicial pro-
cess. For institutional reforms to be carried out effectively under
statutes like Title VII, consent decrees are indispensable because they
lend the authority of the courts to prescriptions for institutional change
without the massive costs of litigating each case. 10 9
Nevertheless, concern about the substantive scope of public law
adjudication and about the process by which it is conducted is not mere
academic formalism. The conventional wisdom about the role of the
courts rightly places a high value on rational decisionmaking based on
due process and the application of articulated standards of substantive
law. The more public law adjudication adheres to these values, the less
it can be attacked as illegitimate.
In appraising Title VII consent decrees with these values in mind,
it is useful to distinguish between the procedure by which courts decide
whether to sign consent decrees, and the substance of what is being
signed."o Procedural fairness requires that persons who will be af-
fected by a decree should have a fair opportunity to be heard and that
the court should have adequate information for its decision. A decree
has substantive merit if what it requires is consistent with the policy of
the law or, taking a broader view, if its prescriptions are moral and
effective. This article will focus primarily on whether Title VII consent
decrees are being approved in a way that is procedurally fair, and
whether the fairness of the procedure might be improved.
104. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coord. Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (requiring regulatory commission to adopt detailed procedures to take environmental
concerns into account when licensing nuclear reactors).
105. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405-06 (1974) (modification of prison rules
and practices to protect the prisoners' constitutional rights).
106. See, eg., Youngber v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309-14 (1982) (patient in state mental hospi-
tal has rights to safe confinement, freedom from bodily restraint, and at least minimal training).
107. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16, (1971) (court
has discretion to shape a remedy for school desegregation plan); see also Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 300 (1954) (courts to consider such factors as school plant, personnel, and school
district revision in considering desegregation plans).
108. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (employment standards
that disproportionately screen out members of minority groups are unacceptable, despite good
intentions of employers).
109. See supra notes 65-69 & 74 and accompanying text.
110. Cf Leff, Unconscionability andthe Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
485, 488 (1967) (analyzing the unconscionability clause of the Uniform Commercial Code by dis-
tinguishing procedural unconscionability in the bargaining process from the substantive uncon-




The problem of procedural fairness in consent decree cases stems
from the fact that public law litigation typically affects a great many
people who are not parties to the lawsuit. When a plaintiff and a de-
fendant propose an institutional consent decree, they are asking the
court for an unlitigated order that will affect a variety of interests in
addition to their own.
A. The Interests at Stake.
In an employment discrimination case, most obviously, the inter-
ests of a minority group are at stake. A Title VII consent decree should
improve employment opportunities for the minority group on whose
behalf the lawsuit was brought. But a consent decree is not guaranteed
to satisfy every member of the minority class; some members of the
group might want a stronger remedy-a higher quota, perhaps, or more
back pay. Moreover, a consent decree may emphasize one kind of re-
lief over another. The stress might be on recruiting and hiring more
members of the minority group; alternatively, it might be on training
and promoting those who have already been hired.I"' Because a con-
sent decree is a negotiated document, the employer will seldom agree to
every conceivable remedial measure. Whatever the relative bargaining
strengths of the parties, employment policies can usually be reformed
in any number of different ways, so the parties have considerable dis-
cretion to opt for one approach rather than another.'1 2 Any consent
decree is therefore liable to benefit some members of the minority
group more-and others less-than would another possible decree.
It is not only the beneficiaries of a consent decree whose interests
are at stake. A Title VII consent decree is likely to diminish opportuni-
ties for white, or male, job applicants and employees. This is true of
almost any form of "affirmative action." Whites suffer in a nebulous
way when an employer merely agrees to recruit minority job applicants
more intensively, because the whites that now apply will have more
111. A practical dilemma that confronts civil rights lawyers is whether to press hardest for
"retrospective" relief for individuals who were discriminated against by the employer-back pay
and job offers with retroactive seniority, for example--or whether to stress "prospective" measures
like hiring quotas and recruitment programs which benefit members of the minority group in
general regardless of whether they were ever victimized by the employer.
112. The Reagan administration's distaste for quotas does not necessarily make it easier for
the Justice Department to settle the Title VII suits that are still being brought by the Civil Rights
Division. Some employers are less willing to sign consent decrees that emphasize "retrospective"
relief, especially back pay, than they are to sign agreements calling for greater minority hiring in
the future. This is because a decree emphasizing back pay usually has greater current out-of-
pocket cost to the employer.
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competition. A hiring quota affects whites more concretely, because
some will be passed over who might otherwise be hired. Promotion
quotas or changes in a seniority system are the most provocative kinds
of relief: they can mean fewer promotions or more lay-offs for whites
already on the employer's payroll." 3 Moreover, a decree in favor of
one minority group may diminish opportunities for other minority
groups simply because the employer may give first priority to hiring or
promoting the beneficiaries of the decree.
More generally, a Title VII consent decree affects the social fabric.
It does so directly, by changing an institutional defendant's behavior; it
does so indirectly to the extent that the decree is a precedent for future
court orders114 and to the extent that other employers change their per-
sonnel practices to conform to the court's order."t5 Consent decrees
also affect the economy, to the extent-probably unquantifiable-that
reforms in personnel policy affect productivity.
All these interests are equally at stake, of course, when a plaintiff
and a defendant litigate an institutional case and the court imposes its
own remedy. The fact that a Title VII remedy may reduce the employ-
ment prospects of whites or males does not necessarily make the rem-
edy improper.116 Moreover, some interests inevitably elude formal
representation in the courtroom: it is not easy, for example, to imagine
the "social fabric" hiring a lawyer or filing an amicus brief. The ques-
tion nonetheless is whether-and if so, how-persons who are not par-
ties to the case but whose interests are significantly affected should have
a say in a consent decree, especially when the decree is entered without
a trial of the facts and without the volley of arguments that might in a
litigated lawsuit guide the court's sense of what remedies are
appropriate.
113. Ironically, it is often the most marginal whites--"those from circumstances least profiting
from the antecedent racism in America"-who pay the price of affirmative action. See Van Al-
styne, .4 Preliminary Report on the Bakke Case, 64 A.A.U.P. BULL. 286, 288 (1978).
114. See supra note 66.
115. The social fabric is unquestionably improved by bringing more members of a minority
group into the mainstream of the economy. There are also more problematic consequences.
Group remedies such as quotas, for example, undoubtedly encourage a sense of group entitlement
in society, and may foster the kind of social balkanization and interest group separatism that
coexist uneasily with the American ethic of individual opportunity and with the ideal of national
solidarity.
116. United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir. 1980) (approving con-
sent decree giving hiring preferences to females and blacks); United States v. City of Jackson, 519
F.2d 1147, 1150 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975); see also United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 208-09 (1979) (Supreme Court approved a 50% minority quota in a company training pro-
gram which was, however, adopted voluntarily and not under court order).
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B. What the Courts Have Done.
1. An Overview. The spectrum of possible procedures for ap-
proving a consent decree ranges from a compulsory trial of the case to
an automatic "rubber stamp" approval of whatever settlement the par-
ties might negotiate. Because consent decrees are an alternative to liti-
gation, courts do not require full-fledged litigation of the defendant's
liability as aprerequisite to a consent decree. 17 In some cases, nonethe-
less, the parties actually negotiate their consent decree only after sub-
stantial litigation.118 At the other procedural extreme, courts often
approve Title VII consent decrees without any formal proceedings
whatever, and without affording any opportunity for nonparties to be
heard. 119
Instead of extensive litigation or automatic approval of settle-
ments, some courts have sought a middle ground by holding fairness
hearings about proposed consent decrees.' 20 A fairness hearing is a fo-
rum in which the participants can make suggestions about the settle-
ment or object to its provisions, without enjoying the right to litigate
the underlying liability of the defendant. Fairness hearings are remi-
niscent of the "notice-and-comment" procedure often required of fed-
eral administrative agencies in their rulemaking.' 2 ' Fairness hearings,
like comments submitted to an administrative agency, are a counter-
part to congressional committee hearings; they expose the court to a
broader range of views concerning the policy choices embodied in a
proposed decree and the likely consequences of those choices. When
fairness hearings bring forth objections to a settlement proposal, the
court generally states its reasons for accepting or rejecting the objec-
tions, just as administrative rulemakers must consider comments and
give reasons for whatever rules are adopted. 122
117. But cf. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (consent decree
modified and in part vacated so as not to bind objecting third party), modfying, 614 F.2d 1322 (5th
Cir. 1980), discussed infra at notes 188-97 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d
1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 1980) (trial court "need only determine that the settlement is fair, adequate,
reasonable and appropriate"); Airline Stewards & Stewardesses Assoc. v. American Airlines, 573
F.2d 960, 964 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (trial court not required to litigate merits of Title VII settle-
ment), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977).
121. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); (requiring notice and opportunity for "interested persons" to
participate in agency rulemaking); see also 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 34, at §§ 6:1-6:2; cf. id, § 6:38
(suggesting that courts have required far greater procedural fairness from administrative
rulemakers than in their own policymaking).
122. After considering comments, an agency must incorporate in its rules a "concise general
statement of their basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). See 1 K. DAVis, supra note 34, at
§ 6:2 (explaining statute).
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When the parties to a class action propose a consent decree the
court must give members of the plaintiff class an opportunity to appear
at a fairness hearing before the decree can be approved. 123 The courts
have otherwise been erratic, however, about holding fairness hearings.
There are often no hearings whatever in Title VII cases brought in the
name of a federal agency rather than in the name of a private class.
Even in class actions, courts often conduct fairness hearings only for
class members, without providing any opportunity for participation by
nonparties such as whites, or members of other minority groups not
represented in the class, whose interests stand to be affected by the con-
sent decree. 124
2. Of "Litigated" Consent Decrees and 'Rubber Stamps. " When
parties negotiate a consent decree after substantial litigation, or even
after the court has been active in pretrial discovery, the judge's expo-
sure to the case may approach what it would be in a fully litigated case.
Thus, even though a court does not require litigation as a prerequisite
to settlement, the judge's knowledge about the ramifications of a con-
sent decree may depend on whether the decree is submitted early or
late in the case. For example, in Officersfor Justice v. Civil Service
Commission,125 the parties submitted a consent decree to integrate the
San Francisco Police Department six years after the plaintiffs filed their
complaint-after the court had ruled on the merits of four preliminary
injunction motions and one motion for partial summary judgment, af-
ter two weeks of trial, and after lengthy settlement negotiations which
the court had directly supervised. 126 The trial judge not only held fair-
ness hearings concerning the consent decree, but was also able to ap-
praise the decree on the basis of several years' acquaintance with the
case and the parties, and in light of a substantial record and his own
preliminary orders. In a sense, a case like Officersfor Justice has the
best of all worlds: the judge is well informed about all the circum-
stances and he has a good basis for weighing the costs and benefits of
various remedial measures, yet it is the parties who formulate the de-
cree; the federal judge need not unilaterally tell the City of San Fran-
123. See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
125. 473 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aft'd, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1217 (1983).
126. Officersfor Justice, 688 F.2d at 618-23. The consent decree is set forth in Officersfor
Justice, 473 F. Supp. at 809-26.
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cisco how to run its police department. 127 The trouble is that Officers
for Justice required six years from the filing of the complaint to the
entry of the consent decree.' 28
Conversely, in many instances the parties negotiate a consent de-
cree before a complaint is even filed; the parties submit their decree
simultaneously with the filing of the complaint and the court promptly
enters judgment without formal proceedings of any kind. In large-scale
Title VII cases this can happen when a government agency like the
Justice Department or the EEOC is the plaintiff. In these situations the
court knows nothing about the case or the context in which it is being
settled and the judge relies on the assurances of the parties, especially
the government agencies involved, that the consent decree is a Good
Thing. 29
This happens fairly frequently, although there is usually no word
of it in the official reports unless someone later goes to court seeking
further action. Of the ninety-three Title VII consent decrees entered
between the Justice Department and "public" employers-state or lo-
cal governments-between 1972 and 1983, nearly a third were submit-
ted together with the complaint and promptly signed by the court,
usually on the same day. 30 In a fairly typical instance, United States v.
City of Jackson,13 a decree with "wide-ranging injunctive relief'-in-
cluding a fifty percent hiring "goal" for blacks, a thirty-three and one-
third percent hiring "goal" for women, and accelerated promotions for
black employees-was filed together with the complaint on a Friday
and signed by the district judge the following Monday. 32
127. See Fletcher, supra note 100, at 653-55 (arguing that courts should encourage institutional
defendants, especially public agencies, to resolve their own remedial problems instead of leaving
things to the diktat of the judge).
128. Offcersfor Justice, 688 F.2d at 619-23. For other Title VII cases in which consent decrees
followed substantial litigation, see United States v. Fairfax County, 629 F.2d 932, 943 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981); United States v. Fairfax County, C.A. 78-862A (E.D. Va.
Apr. 29, 1982) (consent decree for $2.7 million in back pay approved after trial and judgment for
the defendants on the merits and reversal of that judgment by the court of appeals); Luevano v.
Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 72 (D.D.C. 1981) (consent decree restructuring professional hiring in the
United States Civil Service entered after two years of litigation and extensive formal discovery);
Kuck v. Berkey Photo, 87 F.R.D. 75, 76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a typical sex discrimination consent
decree in a private class action, negotiated on the eve of trial after extensive discovery and after
litigation of several motions including one for summary judgment).
129. See W. SELLAR & R. YEATMAN, 1066 AND ALL THATpassim (1936).
130. Files maintained at the United States Department of Justice corroborate these figures.
131. 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1975).
132. Id at 1149-50. The case reached the court of appeals because a local union, whose mem-
bers were black, sued to block the consent decree on the grounds that the back pay provisions
were inadequate. The trial court refused to allow the union to intervene, and the court of appeals
affirmed because the consent decree expressly allowed dissatisfied blacks to decline back pay
under the decree and to sue for a bigger award. See also United States v. City of Milwaukee, 395
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Approving consent decrees on the say-so of the parties would be
understandable if the parties were the only ones with interests at stake.
Public law cases, however, involve a great many other interests. By
treating Title VII cases as conventional two-party lawsuits, many courts
fail to give third parties-minority and white-any chance to be heard.
This can be illustrated in somewhat more detail by comparing Ti-
tle VII class actions-in which at least the minority "beneficiaries"
have some chance to be heard before a consent decree is approved-
with lawsuits by government civil rights agencies in which consent de-
crees are often approved without any hearings whatsoever. As for
white third parties-and minority groups other than the intended bene-
ficiaries of the consent decree-they are often denied a hearing both in
private class actions and in prosecutions by the federal government.
3. Procedural Fairness to Minorities. Before approving a con-
sent decree in a Title VII class action, the trial judge must hold fairness
hearings in which class members are invited to object or to comment on
the proposed decree. This procedure does not give class members a
right to litigate the merits of the case; it does, however, ensure inter-
ested class members a "day in court" to present their views on the rem-
edies that have been negotiated on their behalf. When the federal
government brings a Title VII suit and negotiates a consent decree, on
the other hand, the minority "beneficiaries" are often given no oppor-
tunity to be heard on the adequacy of the remedy.
The formal difference between a class action and a lawsuit by a
federal agency is that the members of a class are considered "parties"
to the case whereas the beneficiaries of a government suit are not. In a
public law case, however, this formal distinction obscures more that it
reveals about the practical effects of a settlement on the minority group
in question.
In a private class action, every member of the class is by definition
a party to the lawsuit, and the doctrine of res judicata binds all the
parties to any judgment in the case. 133 Because members of the class
F. Supp. 725, 726 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (noting that a Title VII consent decree governing the Milwau-
kee Fire Department was entered on the same day the complaint was filed). Typical unreported
consent decrees entered simultaneously with the complaint include United States v. Massachusetts
State Police, C.A. No. 82-2716S (D. Mass. Sept. 16, 1982); United States v. City of Fort Lauder-
dale, C.A. No. 80-6289 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 1980).
133. See Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Co., 656 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir. 1981) (class
member bound by class action judgment provided he was adequately represented); Fowler v. Bir-
mingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1055, 1058 (5th Cir. 1979) (class action decree was final adjudica-
tion of all claims that were or might have been brought on behalf of class member); see generally
7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789 (1972) (discussing the
preclusive effect of judgments in Rule 23 actions).
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may have divergent interests, 34 and because the lawyers representing
the class have interests of their own, the courts recognize the danger
that a settlement might unfairly favor one segment of the class at the
expense of another, or even stint the class in favor of a more generous
award of fees for the lawyers. The remedy for this is procedural. A
class action cannot be settled without notifying the class members 35
and giving them a chance to appear and object before the settlement
becomes final' t36
In practice, most class action consent decrees under Title VII are
approved even when class members appear and state objections to the
settlement. In Officersfor Justice, for example, the court approved an
elaborate consent decree designed to integrate-racially, ethnically,
and sexually-the San Francisco Police Department; the court entered
the decree after considering and rejecting an objection by one of the
eleven named plaintiffs that the settlement afforded insufficient relief
for the named plaintiffs.' 37 In the case involving the hiring test for the
United States civil service (the PACE exam 138) the court considered
objections from 153 of the estimated 100,000 class members, but---en-
couraged by the fact that only a small fraction of the class objected-
the court approved the consent decree as a fair compromise that would
create "substantial" opportunities for minorities seeking federal jobs. 139
134. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
135. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e).
136. See, e.g., Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615, 623-24 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983); Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d
832, 835-36 (9th Cir. 1976) (court cannot reject objections without giving the objector an opportu-
nity to be heard). See generaly7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 133, at § 1797 (discussing
procedure for dismissal or compromise of class actions).
Civil rights class actions are generally brought under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), which governs
cases whose main thrust is for injunctive relief. See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 133,
at § 1775 (subdivision (b)(2) added to Rule 23 to facilitate class actions in civil rights area). A
class member has no right to opt out of a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2). If the class member's
objections fail to persuade the court not to enter a consent decree, the decree will bind the dissent-
ing class member and he is precluded from seeking further relief. See Kincade v. General Tire
and Rubber Co., 635 F.2d 501, 506-08 (5th Cir. 1981). Even if the class is certified under Rule
23(b)(3), which governs cases whose thrust is for money damages, class members may be given
one opportunity to opt out at the beginning of the case but not a second opportunity when the
terms of a consent decree are announced. The logic is that consent decrees would be discouraged
if the class members with the strongest claims could opt out and seek more relief than the settle-
ment compromise affords. Officersfor Justice, 688 F.2d at 635. Under either provision, then, a
class member will be bound by a consent decree unless he or she can convince the judge not to
sign it.
137. 473 F. Supp. at 808.
138. Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68 (D.D.C. 1981).
139. Id at 87. In Cotton v. United States Pipe & Foundry, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
326, 327-28 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1975), arf'dsub nom Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326 (5th Cir. 1977),
the consent decree was approved over the objections of 24% of the class. The judge emphasized
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Approval of class action consent decrees is not automatic, how-
ever, and objections from class members sometimes cause consent de-
crees to be disapproved. In Pe/tway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,t40
for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court may not ratify a
back pay agreement negotiated by the lawyers for the class when all the
named plaintiffs and seventy percent of the class members objected that
the sum was inadequate. 141 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in Franks v.
Kroger,42 held it to be an abuse of discretion to enter a consent decree
that provided cash settlements to the named plaintiffs, substantial attor-
neys fees, and "little, if anything" for the class members.' 43
The class action procedure ensures that the minority class is noti-
fied of an impending consent decree, and, if members of the class have
objections, that the court will hear and consider their views. When the
federal government sues to enforce Title VII, however, the employer
and the federal agency may negotiate, and the district court may ap-
prove, a consent decree without notice and without formal hearings of
any kind.144 The logic of not holding hearings before approving a con-
sent decree in this sort of case is that a suit by a federal agency formally
"binds" no one but the government and the employer being sued; theo-
that the decree was negotiated at arm's length after considerable informal discovery, and that in
some respects the settlement went further than might the remedy in a comparable litigated case.
Judge Pointer refused to award attorney fees to the unsuccessful objectors in Cotton, observing
that "It]hose disgruntled class members who were responsible for organizing the rally which pro-
duced the wealth of objectors to the compromise no doubt have skills which can be of assistance in
raising the funds for compensating their counsel." Id at 334.
See also Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982)
(affirming approval of a settlement which included nearly $1.5 million in back pay and provided
for affirmative action which would cost the employer another million dollars, despite objections to
the settlement as inadequate by all but one of the eleven named plaintiffs; the court found that the
named plaintiffs were objecting to the settlement in order to hold the class hostage to their "exor-
bitant" individual claims); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801-02 & n.3 (3rd
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974) (affirming approval of a settlement despite objections
by more than 20% of the class that the decree gave them "a very small percentage" of their claim
for back pay; approving the compromise, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not file timely
charges and the court speculated, not entirely persuasively, that the plaintiffs might have had
difficulty proving discrimination); Alaniz v. California Processors Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269, 288-89
(N.D. Cal.) (allowing dissenting class members to participate in the hearing which preceded entry
of the consent decree, and explaining why their objections lacked merit, but refusing to let them
intervene as full-fledged parties to the lawsuit), modifled, 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976), ajfdsub
nora. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978).
140. 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 115 (1979).
141. Id at 1213-18.
142. 649 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981).
143. Id at 1226. The trial judge in Franks had rejected a previous settlement proposal after
class members objected that it was inadequate. .d at 1218-19. See also Mandujano v. Basic
Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976) (requiring the district court to consider
the objections of dissenters).
144. See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
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retically, the consent decree does not preclude members of the minority
group from bringing their own lawsuit and seeking greater relief. 145
Yet once there is a consent decree in a government Title VII case,
it is typically the only relief that the minority group will obtain from
the employer. When a consent decree is adopted to restructure em-
ployment policies in a particular way, the parties-as well as the
courts-grow institutionally committed to it. This commitment is rein-
forced rather than weakened by the fact that the parties might have
adopted either a more radical or a gentler remedial scheme. Precisely
because discretionary choices are the hallmark of a public law decree,
the courts and the parties are inclined to stand by whatever choices
they have actually made. For an individual to fight on for more relief
after a consent decree has been approved is likely to be lonely, expen-
sive, and futile.146
A person who files a discrimination complaint with the EEOC
may be left in the same procedural lurch as the beneficiary of a govern-
ment "pattern-or-practice" suit. The EEOC can sue under Section 706
of Title VII on behalf of individuals who have ified discrimination
charges with the Commission. 147 Unlike the Justice Department, the
EEOC seldom brings "pattern-or-practice" cases under Section 707; in-
stead, the Commission often sues for generalized and prospective re-
lief-essentially institutional reform--on the basis of individual
charges under Section 706. The Supreme Court has held that the Com-
mission can do this without complying with the rules for class ac-
tions. 148 The "charging party"-the individual who filed the
administrative complaint-can intervene in such a lawsuit while it is
pending, 149 but there is no requirement of notice to the class, and often
the EEOC does not even inform the charging party when it files suit or
145. See United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir. 1975) (the court noted,
but was not swayed by, two practical problems: the consent decree might influence any back pay
awards in subsequent lawsuits by black individuals, and private lawsuits might in any event be
economically unfeasible once the class of potential plaintiffs was reduced by those who would
"opt for an immediate payoff' under the consent decree).
146. See, e.g., United States v. South Bend Community School Corp., 710 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.
1983) (dismissing a motion to intervene by a predominantly black group of parents objecting to a
school desegregation consent decree negotiated by the federal government). The parents filed a
separate lawsuit against the school district after it had entered into the consent decree, but the
parents later consented "to have their complaint treated as a motion to intervene in the Justice
Department's suit." Id at 395.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982).
148. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333-34 (1980) (interpreting section 706(t)(1)
of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982)).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
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when it negotiates a consent decree.150
In other words, the EEOC is free to negotiate, and the court may
approve, a consent decree without hearing from either the charging
party or the intended class of beneficiaries. What is more, the charging
party is considered a "party" to the lawsuit and is precluded by res
judicata from seeking further relief. Unless he or she has taken the
initiative to intervene and participate directly in the settlement negotia-
tions-often without having been notified of the right to do so, or even
that there is a lawsuit pending-the Commission has a free hand to
negotiate a consent decree. The decree may include inadequate or
nonexistent relief for the charging party, and he or she is simply out of
luck.' 5' If the decree is designed to prevent discrimination in the fu-
ture, the general class of minority or women beneficiaries is in the same
position as its counterpart in a Justice Department "pattern-or-prac-
tice" suit: unlike the charging party, these people are not technically
"bound" by the consent decree, but neither need they be notified or
given an opportunity to object.
When government civil rights agencies negotiate consent decrees,
the willingness of the courts to grant what amounts to automatic ap-
proval may be due to an assumption that the federal government acts
in the public interest. With the best will in the world, however, federal
agencies have their own political and institutional agendas to consider.
The Justice Department, for example, is an arm of the executive branch
of government, and it has been the policy of the Reagan administration
to oppose "aflirmative action" quotas and not to negotiate consent de-
crees with quota provisions. 52 A government consent decree, at least
in this important respect, is therefore apt to differ from the remedy that
private plaintiffs might seek in a Title VII case. The EEOC, for its part,
has a notorious backlog of cases and charges, which can create pressure
to settle more readily than would private plaintiffs.' 53
150. SeeAdams v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 697 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1983) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting) (EEOC does not consider itself under obligation to keep "charging parties" apprised of
settlement negotiations); McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 1977).
151. Incredible, but true, at least in the Fourth Circuit: "If [the charging party] does not inter-
vene and leaves it to the EEOC to do whatever seems best to the EEOC for him, he should not be
heard to complain of the consequences of his own indifference." Adams v. Proctor & Gamble
Mfg. Co., 697 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1981). But seeMcClain v. Wagner Elec. Co., 550 F.2d 1115,
1121 (8th Cir. 1977) ("We do not think, however, that Congress intended by its enactment to
create a situation in which an individual employee without fault or lack of diligence. . . might
find himself unable to file his own suit or to intervene in a suit filed by the Commission.").
152. See supra note 53.




When a judge signs a government consent decree without notice or
hearing, then, the putative beneficiaries do not have an opportunity to
review the impending decree and to object if they think it insufficient.
Yet the scope of such a decree is often indistinguishable from a class
action settlement. Of course, the "class" is theoretically not "bound" in
a government case because there is res judicata only as between the
government and the employer. The realities of institutional litigation,
however, reduce the importance of this distinction. The beneficiaries of
a class action have a chance to be heard before they are bound by a
consent decree. The courts often neglect to give the beneficiaries of a
government suit the same opportunity. 154
4. Procedural Fairness to Whites. By creating job opportunities
for minorities or women, a Title VII consent decree usually means
fewer opportunities for whites or men.155 Nonetheless, courts fre-
quently deny white third parties any opportunity to be heard before a
consent decree is approved. The implicit motive for denying whites a
hearing is the fear that their participation might prevent consensual
settlements, or at least delay them significantly. This would be a legiti-
mate fear if hearings for whites gave them the right to insist on litiga-
tion as a prerequisite to carrying out Title VII remedies. Yet the only
justification for refusing to listen to whites who will be affected by a
consent decree is the fiction that a public law case is like a conventional
lawsuit that concerns only the named parties. Only in a few cases have
courts permitted white third parties to participate in fairness
hearings 156
In Title VII suits initiated by the federal government, as noted pre-
viously, consent decrees are often approved without advance notice
and without the court hearing from anyone-minority or white--other
than the litigants.1 57 In a class action, on the other hand, the court
154. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 842-46 (5th Cir. 1975)
(announcing that an organization representing minorities and women has no standing to object to
the sufficiency of a consent decree in a suit by the federal government, but considering at great
length the objections of the organization to the merits of the decree), ceri. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
See also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982), cer. denied,
103 S. Ct. 1219 (1983) (simultaneous Justice Department and class action lawsuit); Blake v. City of
Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980). When a joint con-
sent decree is negotiated in such a case the beneficiaries have notice and an opportunity to object
as members of the class.
155. The interests of various minority groups may also suffer.
156. See infra notes 174-87 and accompanying text.
157. In these cases, minorities may have no chance to protest to the court about an inadequate
decree. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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cannot approve a consent decree until the members of the class have
been notified and given a chance to object. While Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 does not require formal notice to anyone other than
members of the plaintiff class, as a practical matter the notification of a
minority group usually means that the defendant's white employees
will also find out about the decree. 58 Courts, however, have not been
consistent in their treatment of whites who seek a hearing before the
decree is approved. When they are denied a hearing in a Title VII class
action, it is usually on the pretext that their effort to intervene is
"untimely."
In Culbreath v. Dukakis,159 for example, the First Circuit affirmed
a refusal to allow labor unions, whose members were mostly white, to
intervene in a Title VII class action against various Massachusetts state
agencies. One union moved to intervene one month before the plain-
tiffs and the state submitted their consent decree; three other unions
followed after publication of the settlement proposal. The consent de-
cree effectively imposed a fifty-percent minority quota on hiring and on
certain promotions. The lawsuit had been pending for more than four
years and the district court ruled the intervention motions untimely.
The court reasoned that the unions should have known all along that
the suit was pending and that the plaintiffs' ultimate objective was that
minorities should be employed by the state agencies in proportion to
the local minority population.160 The unions' interest should thus have
been "obvious" from the beginning, and the "expansion of relief' was
"a matter of degree, not of kind."'16
158. In some cases the courts have required that notice of a proposed decree be posted pub-
licly at the employer's workplaces. See, e.g., Alaniz v. California Processors Inc., 73 F.R.D. 269,
274 (N.D. Cal.), modoed, 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976), ajrd sub nom. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis
Foods, 572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978).
159. 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980).
160. Id at 20-21.
161. id at 21. Accord, Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 579 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 969 (1982). For an extreme case, see McPherson v. School District No. 186, 33 Fed. R. Serv.
2d (Callaghan) 978, 979 (C.D. Ill. 1981) in which the judge modified a seven-year-old consent
decree by forbidding lay-offs by seniority; the court rejected as untimely the efforts by a union to
intervene in the modification proceedings because the union members should have foreseen before
the decree was approved that it might later be modified to affect their interests. See also Com-
monwealth v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 507 (3rd Cir.) (in light of the extensive media coverage of the
litigation, appellants should have been aware that their interests were implicated), ceri. denied, 426
U.S. 921 (1976). Cf. Alaniz v. California Processors Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289, 294 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(untimely to intervene after entry of consent decree because there had been extensive notice and
opportunity to be heard before entry of the decree), a.f'dsub nom., Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods,
572 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978). AccordSmith v. Missouri Pacific R.R.
Co., 615 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1980) (untimely to intervene after entry of consent decree because
there was notice of the suit and an invitation to intervene).
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This view is unrealistic in several ways. At the outset of a Title
VII suit, white employees have no way of knowing whether their em-
ployer will decide to settle after several years instead of continuing to
litigate. The whites can fairly say, "We didn't intervene when the par-
ties were at each others' throats because we were relying on our em-
ployer to defend the status quo. We moved to intervene promptly
when we found out our boss was throwing in the towel." It is especially
unrealistic to say that the whites should have known from the outset
that any relief might be at their expense, and that it is only "a matter of
degree" if the decree is unexpectedly costly to their interests. The es-
sence of institutional litigation is that the remedy cannot be deduced
from the defendant's liability; the remedy embodies discretionary pol-
icy choices about the future operation of an institution. The variety of
remedial possibilities in any given case makes it difficult to foresee
which remedies the court or the parties will actually select. Potential
intervenors cannot very well judge whether their interests are in serious
jeopardy until they know what particular remedies are being contem-
plated. The unions in Culbreath moved to intervene when the terms of
the settlement proposal became known. By dismissing their objections
as untimely, the court punished them for failing to foresee the unfore-
seeable. A hint in the Culbreath decision may explain the reluctance of
many courts to listen to whites who will be affected by consent decrees:
"There is a distinct probability that the intervention of the unions will
destroy the consent decree and force a trial on the merits."' 162
Indeed, if giving the objectors a hearing means letting them inter-
vene, and if intervention means the right to veto the settlement, then
the courts have a tremendous incentive not to give the objectors a hear-
ing. Once a party has intervened as a plaintiff or defendant in a con-
ventional lawsuit, he or she is entitled to litigate fully the merits of the
case. 163 Such an intervenor can nullify a consent decree by refusing to
consent to it. Given the courts' strong preference for the settlement of
difficult public litigation, and the special emphasis on "conciliation"
and settlement in Title VII cases, 64 it would be understandable for the
courts not to listen to third parties rather than to give them veto power
over consent decrees. 165
162. Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (Ist Cir. 1980). See also Stotts v. Memphis Fire
Dep't, 679 F.2d 579, 584 (6th Cir.) ("[t]he prospect of delaying the 1980 Decree while the proposed
intervenors engaged in additional discovery and expert analysis" was "correctly" a factor in deny-
ing intervention), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982).
163. See3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 24.1611] (2d ed. 1982).
164. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
165. White employees might have an interest in delaying a remedy even if they will eventually
lose on the merits: while litigation continues, promotions and assignments can still be made in the
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The effect of denying third parties a hearing on a proposed consent
decree is especially dramatic, however, because many courts refuse to
hear subsequent challenges to a consent decree once it has been entered.
For example, the courts peremptorily rejected as an impermissible
"collateral attack" a lawsuit by white males challenging the quota pro-
visions of the consent decree in United States v. City of Jackson.1 66 The
logic of the courts' hostility to "collateral attacks" is that settlements
would be discouraged if they lacked finality, especially if employers
were vulnerable to "reverse discrimination" suits for complying with
consent decrees.1 67 It seems reasonable that an employer should not be
subject to damage suits for obeying a consent judgment, but third par-
ties are in an impossible bind if they are given no opportunity to inform
the court of their interests before a consent decree is entered and if
subsequent efforts on their part to modify the decree are dismissed as
"collateral attacks."
One solution, of course, would be to abandon the idea that collat-
eral attacks are impermissible. In their dissent from the denial of certi-
orari in City of Jackson, Justices Rehnquist and Brennan suggest as
much.168 Finding themselves "at a loss" to understand the origin of the
collateral attack doctrine, they argue that a consent decree "binds the
signatories, but cannot be used as a shield against all future suits by
nonparties seeking to challenge conduct that may or may not be gov-
erned by the decree."' 69 Permitting collateral attacks, however, would
old way, and whatever Title VII remedy is finally imposed, courts are reluctant to dismiss anyone
from a job he or she actually occupies. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979) (upholding affirmative action plan where it did not require the discharge of white workers).
166. Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 255
(1983). The district court rejected these white plaintiffs' motion to intervene in the original action
after the consent decree was entered. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
954, 955 n.2 (S.D. Miss. 1978), a.f'dsub non, Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 618 F.2d 272 (5th Cir.
1980) (per curiam), vacated, 642 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1981), a'd, 687 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 255 (1983).
167. See Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir.
1981) (lawsuit against employer on behalf of white males seeking compensation for "reverse dis-
crimination" dismissed as an impermissible collateral attack on the consent decree); see also Note,
The Employer's Dilemma: Quotas, Reverse Discrimination, and Voluntary Compliance, 8 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 369, 371,388-89 (1977) (pointing out that employers would be in a "Catch-22" position if
they were liable both for discrimination and for "affirmative action" reverse discrimination). But
f W.R. Grace v. Local Union 759, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2186 (1983) (union may bring subsequent
challenge against an EEOC conciliation agreement which-unlike a consent decree-is a settle-
ment not entered as a judgment by a court); McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp.
435, 440 (D.D.C. 1976) (an atypical decision by a district court, refusing to dismiss a "collateral
attack" and reasoning that the employer might properly be held liable both for its original dis-
crimination and for its subsequent remedial "reverse discrimination").
168. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
169. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 104 S. Ct. 255, 257 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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have ominous implications for consent decrees. The prospect of "re-
verse discrimination" litigation would certainly reduce the incentive for
an employer to agree to an "affirmative action" decree. It is not even
clear what would be litigated in the subsequent lawsuit. A logical ap-
proach would be for those challenging the decree to try to disprove the
employer's liability under Title VII. But the parties to a consent decree
usually agree to a settlement precisely in order to avoid litigation of
liability. For this reason, the courts generally deny full-fledged inter-
vention to white third parties before a decree is approved, in order to
encourage settlement rather than litigation of the employer's liabil-
ity.1 70 If collateral attacks were permitted, these public law cases would
be subject to litigation on their merits-but after the entry of judgment
instead of before the verdict. 71
Fortunately, there is another possibility that fits the needs of pub-
lic law adjudication. The court can grant limited intervention to third
parties before approving a consent decree, without giving the interven-
ors the status of full-fledged litigants. 72 Limited intervention means a
day in court to argue whether the terms of a consent decree are reason-
able, or to suggest alternatives and modifications. This kind of inter-
vention helps the court to make an informed judgment about the
consent decree, without giving the intervenors a license to scuttle the
decree or to delay relief by litigating the question of the defendant's
liability. Restricting the terms of intervention-not permitting the in-
tervenors to litigate the employer's liability-is consistent with the at-
tenuated relation of remedy to liability that is characteristic of public
law. Limited intervention is a vehicle for interested third parties to
comment on a proposed decree without being permitted to shift the
court's attention away from the remedy and back to the violation. 73
This was the approach taken in Kirkland v. New York State De-
170. See United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1518-19 (11th Cir. 1983) (expres-
sing doubt about the collateral attack doctrine but refusing to allow white third parties to inter-
vene and litigate before the decree is entered).
171. "'Let the jury consider their verdict,' the King said, for about the twentieth time that
day. 'No no!' said the Queen. 'Sentence first-verdict afterwards."' L. CARROLL, ALICE's AD-
VENTURES IN WONDERLAND 160-61, (M. Gardner ed. 1960).
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee note (1966). ("An intervention of right under
the amended rule may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other
things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings."); see also 3B J. MOORE & J.
KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACriCE 1 24.1014] (2d ed. 1982) (on restricting the scope of per-
missive intervention); see generally Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agen-
des, andArbitrators, 81 HARV. L. RaV. 721 (1968) (litigation rights of an intervenor need not be as
full as the rights of original parties but should be tailored to match the reasons for allowing the
intervention).




partment of Correctional Services, 74 a Title VII class action challenging
the state's civil service examinations in light of their racial impact on
promotions. The plaintiffs and the state agreed to a consent decree
which required, in effect, a short-term twenty-percent promotion quota
for minority officers and a reform of promotional testing in the future.
The court published notice of the settlement proposal, and two groups
of white officers moved to intervene.
The district court granted intervention "solely for the purpose of
objecting to the proposed settlement."' 75 The intervenors argued that
the racial preferences in the decree were improper, and that in any
event there should be no "affirmative action" remedy without a trial
and a judicial determination that the employer violated Title VII. The
court rejected the notion that the intervenors could litigate the em-
ployer's liability or compel the defendants to do so. Instead, the court
analyzed the consent decree carefully, 76 observed that the past system
of promoting employees in strict order of exam grades made meaning-
less differentiations among the candidates, 77 and emphasized that the
racial preferences in the decree were temporary and did not require the
promotion of unqualified minorities or bar the promotion of whites.'78
The court noted that it would not approve job preferences for minori-
ties unless the plaintiffs had at least a serious claim of racial discrimina-
tion, but observed that in this case there were uncontested statistics
indicating that disproportionately few blacks or hispanics had been
promoted. Because such statistics constitute a prima facie case of dis-
crimination, 179 the court approved the consent decree without a trial of
the employer's liability.180
Similarly, in Stallworth v. Monsanto,'8' the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that it is unreasonable to deny third parties a hearing when they
174. 552 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aft'd, 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983).
175. Id at 668.
176. Id at 670-71.
177. Id at 671-72.
178. Id at 676-77.
179. Id (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981)).
180. Kirkland, 552 F. Supp. at 675. See also Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 73 F.R.D.
370,373 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (white intervenors did not dispute defendant's liability but sought modifi-
cations in the consent decree), aft'd, 578 F.2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1978). AccordDawson v. Pastrick, 600
F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979); Vulcan Soe'y v. Fire Dep't of White Plains, 505 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); see also United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 845 n.20 (5th Cir. 1975)
(suggesting that unions be allowed "to intervene in the settlement formalization proceedings"),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc. 73 F.R.D. 269, 274 (N.D.
Cal.) (minority intervenors permitted to enter the case solely for the purpose of participating in a
hearing on the adequacy of a consent decree), modfled, 73 F.R.D. 289 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affidsub
nonm, Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978).
181. 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977).
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offer their objections promptly after the parties propose a consent de-
cree. Stallworth was a class action by black employees challenging,
among other things, Monsanto's use of "departmental" seniority for
promotions, assignments, and lay-offs. (Blacks tended to have low sen-
iority in the desirable departments.) 8 2 Two years after the suit was
filed, the plaintiffs and the company agreed to a consent decree that
abolished the departmental seniority system. 83 The district court ap-
proved the settlement the day it was submitted. One month later a
group of white employees moved to intervene. The district court re-
jected the intervention as untimely. The court of appeals reversed, rea-
soning that the whites acted promptly when they learned of the consent
decree and discovered how seriously their interests were at stake.' 84 If
they were required to intervene at the outset of the case, "when they
ordinarily can possess only a small amount of information concerning
the character and possible ramifications of the lawsuit," it would create
a high "probability that they will misjudge the need for interven-
tion." 8 5 The case was remanded for the trial court to hear the white
intervenors.186
A hearing for the current employees or their unions does not, of
course, ensure any representation for the interests of those who might
apply for jobs in the future. People who may some day apply for a job
are not likely to be aware of it at the time a consent decree is being
considered; they are in no position to learn about the settlement from
their co-workers, nor are they especially apt to pay attention to public-
ity about an impending decree. They are, moreover, not an organized
group. Accordingly, they cannot be expected to appear and speak up
for their interests before the decree goes into effect. The interests of
prospective job applicants from the plaintiff class are represented in a
class action by the named plaintiffs. Before approving a remedy that
will affect future hiring, therefore, a court occasionally permits a
union-whose members are already on the job-to speak for prospec-
tive white applicants. When a plaintiff and an employer are in agree-
ment on such a consent decree, and future white applicants are too
isolated and too unaware to come and speak for themselves, the argu-
182. Id at 260.
183. Id at 261.
184. Id at 267.
185. Id at 265.
186. Id at 261. See also Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1979) (white union's
objections considered, although consent decree reviewed deferentially and upheld on the merits);
Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Products, Inc., 541 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1976) (remanding to the
district court because the consent decree was approved without proper notice to the minority class,
but also remanding for explicit consideration of the effect of the settlement on "Anglo" males).
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ments of a predominantly white union on their behalf may be the best
representation they can realistically obtain before the decree is
approved.187
When a court rejects the "fairness hearing" approach in a public
law case, it can get into serious conceptual and practical difficulties. In
United States v. City of Miami,188 the Justice Department brought a
Title VII suit against the Miami Police Department for discrimination
in hiring and promotions, naming the police union as a defendant as
well.18 9 Shortly after the suit was filed, the Justice Department and the
City submitted a detailed consent decree which included numerical
"goals" for hiring and promoting minorities and women; the decree
also restricted the use of civil service tests. 90 The union refused to sign
the proposed decree and protested that the scheme amounted to "re-
verse discrimination" and infringed the union's collective bargaining
agreement. The district court held several hearings at which the union
aired its objections and eventually approved a modified decree over the
continued objection of the union. 19'
The union appealed 192 and, in a one-paragraph per curiam deci-
sion, the Fifth Circuit en banc announced that it had been "unable to
arrive at a majority consensus as to reasoning and result" in the case. 193
Four separate opinions followed. Writing for five judges, Judge Rubin
affirmed the approval of most of the consent decree. Judge Rubin's
opinion became the mandate of the court, because a majority agreed
that the union should have at least the relief afforded in that opinion.
He noted that the trial judge gave the union "ample opportunity to
187. See Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't of the City of White Plains, 505 F. Supp. 955, 962
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), where the unions representing incumbent firefighters were permitted to argue
that lower job qualifications for new firefighters would be against the public interest because of the
risk that incompetents would be hired. The court considered these objections thoughtfully, Id at
963-67, although in the end it approved the decree. Cf. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d
435, 445 (5th Cir. 1981) (union has no standing to object to hiring quota because the union's
members are already on the job). A judge who entertains objections to hiring remedies from a
union must beware of the possible conflict of interest: the union might try to bargain away the
interests of nonmembers in favor of the promotional or seniority interests of its members on the
job.
188. 614 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1980), modled, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
189. Id
190. The decree is reproduced in City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1343-5 1.
191. City of Miami; 664 F.2d at 438-39.
192. In the union's initial appeal to a three judge panel, the court held that the terms of the
decree were lawful and that the union's assent was not necessary. City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1329.
Judge Gee dissented, condemning hiring and promotion quotas as improper preferential treat-
ment, especially where the employer had not been found guilty of discrimination. Id at 1353-55
(Gee, J., dissenting).
193. City of Miamfi 664 F.2d at 436.
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muster its objections and considered its arguments fully. 1 94 Calling
the city's signature on the decree a "tacit admission of discrimina-
tion,"' 195 Judge Rubin concluded that the provisions of the decree, in-
cluding the hiring "goals," were "in accordance with the policy of Title
VII" and should be approved as between the Justice Department and
the city. 196 The only parts of the decree that directly affected the union,
he said, were the promotion quotas and the restrictions on using civil
service tests for promotions. The union, a defendant in the case, could
not in Rubin's view be bound to these provisions without its consent.
Judge Rubin directed that the case be remanded so that the union
could contest these provisions by litigating whether the city had been
guilty of discrimination.197
The case revolved around the fact that the union was named as a
defendant and was never dropped as a party. 198 The opinions in the
case were based on the idea that a party cannot be "bound" by a judg-
ment without its consent unless it has lost a litigated case. However, if a
party is dropped it is not bound, so it cannot veto a settlement between
the remaining parties. 199
194. Id at 444.
195. Id at 442. The decree explicitly provided that it did not "constitute an adjudication or an
admission by any of the defendants of any violation of law." City of Miami 614 F.2d at 1343.
196. City of Miami; 664 F.2d at 442.
197. Id at 447-48. Judge Gee, writing for eleven judges, would have reversed the approval of
the entire consent decree as long as the union did not sign it. Id at 451-53 (Gee, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). As a party to the suit, said Gee, the union was entitled to a trial on
the merits and an adjudcation of the facts. Id at 452 (Gee, ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Gee suggested, however, that if the Justice Department and the city should conclude
that binding the union to the settlement "is not after all necessary to their purposes, they may of
course seek its dismissal from the case and the reentry of the decree forthwith." Id at 453 (Gee, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Johnson, writing for seven judges, would have affirmed the entire consent decree be-
cause the trial judge gave the union several fairness hearings and took its objections into account
before finally approving the decree. Id at 461-63 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Judge Johnson found the settlement reasonable and concluded that it did not infringe
upon the union's rights. The district judge, Johnson observed, should have dismissed the union as
a party so that its consent would not be needed. Id at 461-62 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
In a separate opinion, Judge Tjoflat concluded that the decree did not impose any relief
against the union, so the court should not have entertained the union's appeal. Id at 453-54
(Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
198. Nineteen judges explicitly held that once the union was dismissed the decree could be
approved: Judge Gee and his ten colleagues, id. at 453, Judge Johnson and his six, id at 462, and
Judge Tjoflat, id at 453. The remaining five judges represented by Judge Rubin did not reject this
suggestion.
199. This is the logic of the Rubin opinion: most of the decree is affirmed because it does not
"affect" the union. Yet Judge Rubin's conclusion that the district court acted properly in approv-
ing most of the decree is based in part on the fact that the district judge fully considered the
union's objections to the very provisions which do not "bind" the union! See id at 444.
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Yet the practical effect on the union's members is the same regard-
less of whether or not the union is a formal "party." Once a consent
decree is approved, the "collateral attack" doctrine bars any lawsuit
challenging the decree or seeking damages for its consequences. 200 A
case like United States v. City of Miami ends in confusion because it
attempts to treat an institutional case as though it were a conventional
lawsuit. In a conventional lawsuit it is the parties whose interests are
primarily at stake, and the judge does not have to exercise much discre-
tion in imposing a remedy tailored to the violation. In such a case, due
process plausibly means the right to litigate fully before being subjected
to an unwelcome verdict. This right to litigate is less plausible in public
law adjudication. An institutional Title VII remedy will affect the
working lives of many people who are not parties to the lawsuit. If
everyone affected by a public law decree had the right to insist on liti-
gation, there would probably never be a consent decree and every pub-
lic law case would be litigated, because there would always be at least
one person dissatisfied with the choice of any remedy that might be
selected.
In fact, when parties negotiate Title VII consent decrees the courts
approve them in the overwhelming majority of cases.201 This is true
despite the occasional case like United States v. City of Miami in which
a court recoils from approving a consent decree because some inter-
ested person insists that the case should be litigated.202 What varies
most from case to case is the willingness of courts to permit third par-
ties to comment and propose modifications before a decree is approved.
In cases like Kirkland and Stallworth the courts considered and
approved institutional consent decrees after granting limited interven-
tion to interested third parties and after holding fairness hearings for
all concerned. This procedure, however, is not by any means universal.
There are numerous Title VII suits brought by government civil rights
agencies in which the courts approve consent decrees without prior no-
tice and without hearing from anyone but the lawyers for the govern-
ment and the employer. Minority group beneficiaries of these decrees
have no opportunity to argue that the remedy is inadequate, just as
whites have no chance to argue that the remedy is unfair to them. Sim-
ilarly, in private class actions, although the minority class members
200. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
202. The idea that interested persons should be free to litigate is also implicit in Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, in Ashley v. City of Jackson, 104 S. Ct. 255, 257 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and in dictum in United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511,
1518 (1lth Cir. 1983).
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must be notified of a settlement and given a chance to object, all too
often the courts refuse to listen to nonparties.20 3
C. A Systematic Approach to Procedural Fairness.
The following procedure should be adopted whenever the parties
propose a consent decree in an institutional Title VII case:
(1) Notice of a proposed consent decree should be published so
that people who are likely to be affected will have a chance to find out
about it before it is approved;204
203. When a consent decree is approved on behalf of one minority group, the possible indirect
effects on other minority groups usually get short procedural shrift in both class actions and gov-
ernment suits. A consent decree may diminish opportunities for other minority groups because
the employer will now give first priority to hiring or promoting the beneficiaries of the decree.
The problem is particularly dramatic when a decree gives women retroactive seniority over blacks
who are not the subjects of the lawsuit, see, e.g., EEOC v. McCall Printing Corp., 24 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1980) (discrimination suit by women after blacks had negoti-
ated an agreement granting them retroactive seniority rights), or where a decree might call for
scrapping a hiring test which tends to screen out black applicants even though women do well on
it. The existence of a consent decree does not, of course, preclude a different group from later
suing the employer for discrimination. See Worley v. Western Electric Co., 28 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 32,417 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (plaintiffs could have intervened in earlier action resulting in
consent decree, but failure to do so did not defeat their right to bring independent action for sex
discrimination). After the approval of a decree which gives preference to members of one group,
however, another minority group will not be able to attack the preference-that would be a "col-
lateral attack" on a consent decree. Id at 23,818.
As a practical matter, there may be considerable publicity about an impending consent de-
cree, and members of various minority groups may take the initiative and come to court with their
views. In Johnson v. North Carolina State Highway Patrol, 91 F.R.D. 406 (E.D.N.C. 1980), for
example, the judge refused to allow a group of American Indians to intervene before he entered a
consent decree in favor of blacks and women. The Indians' objections, however, were heard and
the parties modified the decree to take one of the Indians' points into account. Id at 407 n. I.
204. Cf 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982) (laying down procedural guidelines for antitrust consent
decrees negotiated by the Justice Department). Under the Antitrust Penalties and Procedures Act,
a proposed consent decree must be published in the Federal Register together with background
information and a "competitive impact statement." 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1982). A summary of the
decree and the competitive impact statement must also be published in local newspapers. 15
U.S.C. § 16(c) (1982). Public comments must be invited and published in the Federal Register. 15
U.S.C. § 16(d) (1982). The court may grant full or limited intervention to interested persons, or
may seek out other views through less formal procedures. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f) (1982). The court
may approve the decree only upon a finding that it is in the public interest. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)
(1982).
Whatever the experience in antitrust cases, there is good reason to believe that "affirmative
action impact statements" would unnecessarily bureaucratize the Title VII process; moreover,
public notice in the Federal Register would reach at best a somewhat specialized class of job
applicants and employees affected by Title VII consent decrees. To publicize a Title VII consent
decree, newspaper notices and postings on plant bulletin boards should suffice handsomely. See
generally Branfman, Antitrust Consent Decrees-A Review and Evaluation of the First Seven Years
Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 303 (1982). Branfman
reports that third parties have consistently been denied full intervention, although they have been
allowed to appear informally and to object to the decree. Id at 326-27. He concludes that the
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(2) There should be a fairness hearing about the proposed decree,
open to nonparties as well as to class members. Interested third parties
should be granted limited intervention as a procedural basis for their
participation and as a basis for appeal;20 5
(3) A union or other organization that wishes to comment on the
effects of a settlement on nonmembers of the union, such as prospective
job applicants, should be permitted to do so, especially if there is no
other spokesman for the interests of the nonmembers;20 6
(4) The hearing should be sufficiently detailed to allow the court to
appreciate the equities of the situation. In an institutional employment
discrimination case, the record should articulate the statistical evidence
of discrimination. Several days may be required for an adequate airing
of comments and suggestions, especially when a large employer is in-
volved and there are numerous interested parties. The hearing, how-
ever, should not be so detailed as to permit litigation of the underlying
allegations of the employer's liability under Title VII; and
(5) The court should explain whatever action it takes, describing
why a particular remedial scheme seems to be justified and giving a
reasoned response to objections and suggestions.207
All this should be done systematically, not erratically as at present.
A statute is not a prerequisite to the adoption of these procedures;
much of the substance as well as the procedure of Title VII has always
been a matter of judge-made law.20 8
The procedure suggested here is reminiscent of the class action
procedure for hearing objections to proposed settlements. The differ-
ence is that fairness hearings in a class action are intended for members
of the plaintiff class, whereas limited intervention is a means of giving a
hearing to nonparties who stand to be affected by a consent decree.
Fairness hearings are also analogous to the "notice-and-comment" pro-
cedure for rulemaking by federal administrative agencies; that proce-
dure allows interested parties to offer comments and suggestions-but
statute has not undermined the Justice Department's ability to negotiate consent decrees, and that
the procedure has resulted in beneficial modifications in a number of decrees, id at 352-54.
205. See First Colonial Corp. of Am. v. Baddock, 544 F.2d 1291, 1297-98 (5th Cir. 1977)
(limited intervenors have standing to appeal if they are dissatisfied with the decisions of the trial
court), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 904 (1977).
206. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
207. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th
Cir. 1980) (when approving settlement, court must determine that settlement is fair, adequate,
reasonable, and appropriate under the facts); see also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
688 F.2d 615, 624-25 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983).
208. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1984:887
CONSENT DECREES
not to litigate-before administrative policy decisions are adopted. 20 9
The most obvious virtue of a fairness hearing is that when it is
conducted in good faith it forces the court-and the parties as well-to
consider alternatives and to articulate why a proposed decree is desira-
ble. Because there are usually many possible remedies in a public law
case and discretionary choices must therefore be made, a hearing for
third parties focuses attention on whether a particular set of remedies is
as fair as possible to all concerned. A fairness hearing not only respects
the autonomy of affected persons by giving them a forum to influence
the decree, it also provides a forum for the court and the parties to
explain the settlement to those who may be adversely affected by it, and
perhaps to reconcile them to the necessity for it.
Fairness hearings would also make trial judges' decisions about
consent decrees more accessible to appellate review. The courts of ap-
peals routinely hold that the approval of a consent decree should be
reversed only if it is found to be an abuse of the trial judge's discre-
tion.210 Procedural decisions, such as whether to listen to objections
from third parties, are also reversible only for abuse of discretion. 21'
The abuse-of-discretion "standard" is something of an incantation, but
in practice it means that the trial judge's approval of a settlement is
usually upheld on appeal.212 There is a greater basis for intelligent ap-
209. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). This provision of the Administrative Procedure Act pro-
vides for "notice-and-comment" rulemaking except when an agency is required by statute to hold
trial proceedings "on the record." Id See also 1 K. DAvis, supra note 34, at § 6:1 (noting that
trial-type proceedings for rulemaking have "dwindled drastically"). Professor Davis urges that
there should uniformly be public notice and an opportunity to comment on policymaking and the
finding of "legislative facts," but that trial-type proceedings are not suited to "legislative" deci-
sionmaking. Id at § 12:8.
210. See, e.g., Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 75 (7th Cir. 1979) (court's approval of consent
decree should not be reversed in the absence of abuse of discretion, because Congress intended
settlement to be the preferred resolution of discrimination cases); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326,
1331 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
211. See Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't., 679 F.2d 579, 585 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S.
969 (1982); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1980) (trial judge has discretion to
decide whether intervention is timely, and the decision is not to be reversed in absence of abuse);
Stallworth v. Monsanto, 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977).
212. When a district judge refuses to approve a settlement, in whole or in part, the abuse-of-
discretion standard is elastic enough to enable a court of appeals to reverse and to order that the
decree be approved, sometimes after an analysis that resembles a de nova review of a point of law.
See, e.g., Williams v. City of New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987, 991-98 (5th Cir.) (after ruling that de
novo review by appellate court is not always appropriate, court extensively reviews evidence of
reasonableness of the decree), rehjg granted, 694 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1982). Cf. United States v.
City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980) (where the same court conducted an
explicitly de nova review of a trial judge's refusal to approve a consent decree). In City of4exan-
dria, the trial judge had heard no evidence and no one had sought to intervene or to object to the
decree. Id at 1362. The court of appeals reasoned that:
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pellate review, however, when third parties have had the opportunity to
put their objections on the record and the district court has responded
to those objections and stated the reasons for its actions. The availabil-
ity of a meaningful record increases the realistic possibility of a "sec-
ond look" by the court of appeals.213
These procedural suggestions are not, unfortunately, a panacea for
the problems that surround Title VII consent decrees. Fairness hear-
ings can have drawbacks for all concerned in a Title VII case. In the
first place, fairness hearings increase the risk of the court finding the
settlement unfair, and directing the parties either to renegotiate or to
litigate. Even if the settlement is approved, the starting point for justi-
fying it over any objections is usually that there is a prima facie statisti-
cal case of discrimination, which an employer may be reluctant to see
articulated on the record.2 14 More generally, to invite objections is to
risk clouding the conciliatory atmosphere which a consent decree is
designed to promote. A consent decree is inherently a compromise, and
whether objections come from members of minority groups or from
whites, criticism is bound to put the plaintiff, the employer, or both on
the defensive. The routine and well-publicized availability of fairness
hearings in Title VII cases may actually stimulate organized opposition
to many consent decrees by creating a forum in which rhetorical points
can be scored at little cost to the objectors. Any or all of these consider-
ations might diminish the willingness of some litigants to settle Title
VII cases, although even with fairness hearings, settlements would still
be incomparably less onerous than litigation in most large Title VII
cases.
215
There remains the anomaly that an objector or limited intervenor
is by definition precluded from litigating the underlying merits of the
case. It is a partial answer to say that the remedy in an institutional
We do not carry the mistaken notion that heightened review of district court refusals
to enter consent decrees will resolve the almost intractable problems in this area. But we
do not believe that individual federal judges should have almost unchallengeable power
to slow or halt the progress of well-intentioned efforts to eradicate the effects of past
discrimination and prevent future discrimination.
d
213. Such appellate accountability would not prevent the federal courts from continuing to
view consent decrees as presumptively valid. See Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm'n, 688
F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir. 1982) (announcing that approval of the consent decree would only be
reversed for "clear abuse of discretion"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217 (1983). In its opinion, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit treated the various objections to the decree seriously enough to analyze
them in depth and at some length. See id at 626-36.
214. One reason for articulating the prima facie case is that it might help reconcile the affected
whites to the need for a Title VII remedy.
215. See United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 851 n.28 (5th Cir. 1975)
(speculating that full litigation of the case might take 28 years), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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case is prospective and not strictly based on the violation-that public
law is about making policy for the future and that the details of the
underlying violation are irrelevant. This is true, but only up to a
point.216 The anomaly is explained but not resolved by saying that in-
stitutional cooperation is essential for effective reform under a law like
Title VII; consent decrees are therefore desirable, third parties should
not be given a veto, and it is better to give such third parties a hearing
on the choice of a remedy than to exclude them from the process
entirely.
There is even some ambiguity about what third parties can gain by
participating in fairness hearings. They can certainly protest the occa-
sional settlement that is clearly illegal-a decree endorsing discrimina-
tion, for instance, or one calling for a permanent one-hundred-percent
quota for minorities. Within broad limits, however, institutional reme-
dies are discretionary; any number of possible remedies would be le-
gal.217 There is some cathartic value in holding fairness hearings
before putting the court's authority behind any major institutional
change; an open forum for those affected is partly a ritual of "hearing
all sides." Still, psychodrama is not an end in itself, and fairness hear-
ings do not abolish the remedial discretion that goes into a consent
decree.
What third parties can do through fairness hearings and limited
intervention is to influence informally the exercise of that discretion.
In numerous cases, the comments and objections of third parties have
in fact evoked modifications of consent decrees.2 18 Participants in fair-
ness hearings are free to suggest alternatives. Their success will depend
216. Cf generallyE. WAUGH, Scooppassirn (1937) (the hilarious novel in which a newspaper
tycoon's underlings reply "Definitely, Lord Copper" when they mean "yes," and "Up to a point"
when they mean "no.").
217. Professor William Fletcher has suggested that by listening to interested nonparties, the
courts may be tempted to "balance" away the remedial rights of the parties in favor of the nonle-
gal interests of the nonparties. Fletcher, supra note 100, at 658-59. This might indeed be a danger
if the plaintiffhad a legal "right" to some particular remedy. The nature of institutional litigation,
however, is that there is no one "correct" remedy. In each case it is a matter of discretion and
choosing a good policy. (Fletcher is generally troubled about the legitimacy of institutional adju-
dication precisely because it entails so much open-ended discretion. Id passim.).
218. See, eg., Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 73-74 (7th Cir. 1979) (trial court withdrew its
approval for a partial consent decree establishing racial hiring quotas, after intervenor-union ob-
jected); Vulcan Soc'y v. Fire Dep't, 505 F. Supp. 955, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (consent decree as
originally proposed would have abolished requirement of high school diploma for firefighters;
requirement reinstated in revised decree after objections by union intervenor); see also United
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 438-39 (5th Cir. 1981) (parties modified the pension provi-
sions of their settlement after union objections at a hearing on entry of the decree in the district
court); EEOC v. Wood Wire & Metal Lathers' Union Local 11, 23 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
567, 568 (4th Cir. 1977) (case remanded for possible modification of consent decree in response to
intervenor's objections); Johnson v. North Carolina State Highway Patrol, 91 F.R.D. 406, 407 n.1
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on their persuasiveness. Procedural fairness means the opportunity to
be persuasive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII adjudication is an example of how courts have become a
forum for institutional change in American society. Although the fo-
rum is judicial, public law cases are often not litigated; instead, the
parties negotiate broad policy prescriptions which the courts approve in
the form of consent decrees. Even in a fully litigated public law case,
the existing' rules of procedure do not oblige the courts to hear from all
the innumerable people with an interest in the outcome; but at least the
decision affecting those interests is that of the court, not the parties, and
it is based on a factual record developed through the adversary process.
With a consent decree, on the other hand, far-reaching institutional re-
forms can be negotiated by parties who do not represent all the inter-
ests that will be affected, and the courts often ratify these reforms
independently of the adversary process.
The federal courts have willingly--even eagerly-embraced public
law consent decrees. They have had good reason for doing so. Broad
public law statutes like Title VII make the courts responsible for defin-
ing and enforcing reforms in a large number of public and private insti-
tutions. Compulsory litigation of every case would be prohibitively
expensive, and would undermine the cooperative and noncoercive at-
mosphere in which complex reforms are best planned and carried out.
In welcoming consent decrees, however, the courts have failed to
develop any consistent procedure for hearing from interested nonpar-
ties. The reasons for this failure are not difficult to divine. Consent
decrees are convenient and perhaps indispensable for the effective en-
forcement of the statute. It would be self-defeating for the courts to
give third parties the right to insist on litigation and thus to veto con-
sent decrees. Short of the right to litigate, any hearing for third parties
smacks more of legislative or administrative activity than of judicial
procedure. Many courts have been reluctant to face the implications of
how the legislative and adjudicative styles of decisionmaking converge
in public law cases. Hence the fiction that the parties' interests are the
only ones at stake and the refusal in many cases to listen to nonparties.
This article recommends fairness hearings, open to all concerned,
before the approval of Title VII consent decrees. To approve a consent
decree without such hearings is to diminish the autonomy of those de-
(E.D.N.C. 1980) (parties amended the hiring provisions of their decree to take account of objec-
tions of third-party American Indians).
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nied their "day in court." Also, without fairness hearings, the court has
less information to rely on to make a responsible decision about the
decree.
Greater procedural fairness in consent decree cases will not, of
course, resolve the substantive dilemmas that surround "affirmative ac-
tion." "Affirmative action" will continue to raise unusually difficult
questions of policy, because the conflicting calls for colorblindness and
for racial reconstruction are each so resonant. "Affirmative action" is a
live political issue precisely because there is no clear right answer; ,each
side in the debate can invoke public values implicit in the Constitution
and in the civil rights statutes.219 Greater procedural openness and
more judicial oversight might, however, lead to a better focused view of
which minority groups should receive preferences, for what kinds of
jobs, and with what objectives in mind.220 It might also help reconcile
whites and other objectors to the propriety of the remedies the courts
approve.
219. One plausible view of "equal opportunity" is that people should be treated as individuals
without regard to their race, and that the time for the law to enforce this principle is now. On this
view, quotas and other racial preferences are inherently unfair: unfair to whites who are penal-
ized because of their race, unfair to society which continues to be distorted by allocations on the
basis of race, and unfair to minorities who are stigmatized as requiring special preferences. For a
sample of scholarly writings that are generally critical of "affirmative action," see A. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975); Kurland,
Ruminations on the Quality of Equality, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1; Posner, The Bakke Case and the
Future of Affirmative Action, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 171 (1979); Scalia, The Disease as Cure; 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 147; Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, The Supreme Court, and the Constitution,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1979).
The opposite view also draws on values implicit in the idea of "equal opportunity." This
view emphasizes America's long and bitter history of discrimination, and urges that since minori-
ties were victimized as groups they now require compensatory preference on a group basis. Fair-
ness, on this view, requires group preferences as the only effective way to end invidious
discrimination and to remedy the continuing economic and human effects of past discrimination.
See Justice Marshall's eloquent opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
387 (1978) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a sample of scholarly writings that
generally support "affirmative action," see Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimina-
tion, 41 U. CHI. L. RaV. 723 (1974); Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimina-
tion, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 87 (1979); Griswold, The Bakke Problem, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 55; Karst &
Horowitz, 4ffirmative Action and Equal Protection 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974). See generally
EQuALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT (M. Cohen, T. Scanlon & T. Nagel eds. 1977); R.
FULLINWINDER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY: A MORAL AND LEGAL ANALY-
sis (1980).
220. Cf C. Jencks, AffnativeAction, New York Review of Books, Mar. 3, 1983, at 33 (pt. 1)
and Mar. 17, 1983, at 12 (pt. 2). Jencks explores the human and social costs of "affirmative ac-
tion," as well as the arguments for it, and suggests that minority quotas should not be higher than
are necessary to discourage actual invidious discrimination against minorities. See also Jencks,
Sowell, Glaberman, & Schwarzschild, EthnicAmerica" An Exchange New York Review of Books,
June 16, 1983, at 47; Scanlan, Employment Quotasfor WomenZ 73 THE PuB. INTEREST 106, 108-10
(1983) (arguing that quotas are so problematic that they should be reserved for blacks, whose
history and present situation in this country are unique).
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Whatever the outcome in these cases, it will be impossible to
please everyone. Consent decrees will at least promote honest public
debate instead of frustrating it so long as the courts are prepared to
justify the settlements they approve. This requires facing the people
affected and articulating the public values that underlie each decision.
Fairness hearings in consent decree cases are one step towards the
recognition that courts are part of the government and that public law
remedies are governmental policy decisions. Governments, like indi-
viduals, must make decisions about their future without conclusive as-
surances that their decisions are correct. Fairness hearings are an
opportunity for dialogue about institutional reform. Dialogue pre-
serves the intellectual integrity and the fidelity to public values which,
after all, are the bases of the courts' authority to decide public
questions.
